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DEDICATION
To the Memory of My Father
So, they are not underground,
But as nerves and veins abound
In the growths of upper air,
And they feel the sun and rain,
And the energy again
That made them what they were!
from Transformations by Thomas Hardy
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ABSTRACT
It is common practice to limit solutions for most problems in computer and network security
to the purview of the digital domain. Certainly, digital solutions offer much in the way of
addressing the security concerns associated with computer and network monitoring and access
control. In many areas, however, the available techniques are limited because of their digital
nature: authentication schemes are vulnerable to the theft of digital tokens; intrusion detection
systems can be thwarted by spoofing or impersonating devices; forensic analysis is incapable
of demonstrably tying a particular device to a specific network connection after the fact; and
assurance monitoring systems can only provide notification of failures rather than impending
failures. In order to address these concerns researchers have proposed, in work falling under
the general heading of physical layer identification (PLI), that the signaling behavior of digital
devices manifested at the physical layer be used for identification and monitoring purposes.
This work presents a secure methodology, capable of reliably identifying and tracking wired
Ethernet cards of the same make and model to a high degree of accuracy, which may be
used to corroborate higher layer mechanisms used in authentication and intrusion detection.
A framework is also devised, and applied to this methodology, to judge the security of a
PLI scheme by determining how resistant it is to forgery attacks using arbitrary waveform
generators.
While a PLI scheme must be resistant to attack, it must also be able to identify the pre-
ponderance of devices within a given population to be of any practical value. Therefore, a
technique, based upon the signalling behaviour specified for Ethernet devices in the IEEE
802.3 standard, is set forth for estimating the theoretical number of devices the methodology
is capable of distinguishing between.
Finally, if it can be understood how the individual components of a device give rise to dif-
ferences in device behaviour, it should be possible to not only model devices for the purposes of
xiii
creating new identification and tracking methodologies, but perhaps also allow the community
to determine exactly which components should be modified to create device signals resistant to
forgery. With this in mind, a methodology is proposed that describes how a device component
should be measured to create a model that captures its signalling behaviour, as well as how
it can be determined whether or not, and to what extent, the component shapes the device’s
identity.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
It is common practice to limit solutions for network-based authentication, and indeed most
problems in computer and network security, to the purview of the digital domain. While
it is true that working with the digital rather than physical representation of information is
perhaps a more tractable approach—one that can, in certain instances, provide definite proof
of the soundness of the method or, at the very least, allow us to state that given our current
knowledge of various algorithms, theorems, and state-of-the-art technology, our data should
be sufficiently well-protected for the next n-years—this emphasis nevertheless overlooks the
potential of the physical layer. It instead treats the physical layer as a source of problems or,
at best, as something that must be abstracted away.
In the hope of ameliorating such a natural and understandable predilection, this work
focuses on differentiating wired Ethernet devices by identifying differences in analogue signalling
behaviour, with the goal of using the unique characteristics of signals at the physical layer to
corroborate higher layer mechanisms used for authentication, intrusion detection, and assurance
monitoring. Specifically, we show that it is possible to discriminate between Ethernet cards of
the same make and model and that the signal variability which makes this possible is manifested
over a range of spectral and temporal locales.
To set forth but one example where physical layer corroboration could prove useful, con-
sider the limitations of current network access control methods that rely on the use of digital
tokens (network keys) or identifiers (usernames and passwords) to prevent unauthorized access.
Even strong tokens and identifiers (secure certificates, for example), by their purely digital na-
ture, can be discretely copied if improperly secured and put to use by malicious users. Even
worse, popular weak identifiers, such as MAC addresses, can be easily obtained through pas-
sive network monitoring and spoofed through the use of a programmable network card. In
2contrast, using the unique physical characteristics of devices for identification, in conjunction
with current digital practices, could enhance security, as physical features are nearly impossible
to obtain (a measurement of the device cannot be done without physical access to the medium)
and duplicate.
1.1 Physical layer identification
Building on a tradition dating back to World War II, and inspired by the work of RF engi-
neers in 1990s, researchers of differing fields and expertise began to experiment with identifying
network, sensor, and RFID devices in the early to mid 2000s using only the electrical emana-
tions of said devices (see Chapter 2 for a detailed review of this history). As they are primarily
concerned with the physical layer of the OSI model, these approaches to identity verification
can easily be thought of as physical-layer identification schemes (PLIS). The methodology and
goals of such works are essentially that of biometrics—identifying devices by non-digital means,
though usually only as an aid to existing authentication procedures (by common consensus,
they should not be used exclusively for authentication)—with the distinction that the systems
under study are non-biological or inanimate.
Physical layer identification, as a technique for intrusion detection, authentication, or foren-
sics, depends upon variability in device behaviour, classifier sensitivity, and the inability of an
attacker to adequately emulate device behaviour (for assurance monitoring only the first two
are of consequence). Before the security of a particular approach can be evaluated, it is nec-
essary to determine whether devices vary significantly and consistently enough across a given
population for a particular identification methodology to reliably differentiate them. Having
established this, we must then consider whether device behaviour can be readily emulated. It
must be emphasised that the self-evident claim that no two devices can be made to produce
exactly the same networking signals is not in itself enough to prove the validity of physical layer
identification—signal variation is itself defined with respect to the discriminatory methodology
used in identifying devices, while its relevance is determined by the ability or inability of an
attacker to produce high fidelity forgeries.
There are three aspects of device variability that need to be considered in relation to physical
3layer identification schemes, namely its extent, consistency, and origin. Whether or not we are
able to profile and track a device depends upon the device exhibiting its unique behaviour in a
consistent manner. To account for the observable amount of change a device undergoes during
the course of operation, we must capture the velocity and degree of change during steady state
operation and after the device has lost and re-established connectivity. While understanding
the origin of such variations may be of use in modelling device behaviour, and hence aid in the
construction of device profiles and tracking regimes, it also bears directly upon the security
of PLIS. Consider that if an attacker understands the degree to which individual components
contribute to differences in device behaviour, they could attempt to engineer devices that
conform to known devices by targeting just those components most responsible for expressing
identifiable characteristics. Of course, the job of imitating a particular device is considerably
easier if the extent of observed variation of a population of devices is not appreciable enough to
be discerned by the identification methodology. Determining whether a given methodology is
even practicable requires that we test it via application to a statistically significant sample of
devices and calculate the theoretical number of devices it is capable of distinguishing between.
Such a theoretical analysis is dependent upon the sensitivity of the underlying classification
technique(s). The term sensitivity is meant in this context to denote population sensitivity, or
the number of devices that can be distinguished using a particular methodology.
While establishing that an identification methodology is capable of distinguishing between,
and tracking, a population of devices is necessary to prove the security of a PLIS, it is not
sufficient. To establish sufficiency it must be determined, according to some measure, how
different two signals need be before they can be identified as such. Again, this calculation is
dependent upon the sensitivity of the classifier, though in this case sensitivity refers to how
close two signals must be in order to produce identical results (we will use the term difference
sensitivity to avoid ambiguity with population sensitivity). Once this is decided, we must
resolve whether an attacker, using current technology, is able produce an acceptable forgery
using either an arbitrary waveform generator or by modifying an existing device.
In what follows we investigate the use of PLIS for authentication and forensics (Chapter
4) and propose solutions to address the issues of difference sensitivity (Chapter 5), population
4sensitivity (Chapter 6), and origin of variation (Chapter 7).
1.2 Rationale and scope of work
While this work is primarily concerned with the feasibility of identifying Ethernet cards by
highlighting differences at the physical layer, our work more broadly attempts to utilise, through
the examination of the analogue and digital characteristics of digital devices, the principle
of security through physicality for such security purposes as intrusion detection (discovering
node impersonation and network tampering), authentication (preventing unauthorized access
to the physical network), forensic data collection (tying a physical device to a specific network
incident), and assurance monitoring (determining whether a device will or is in the process of
failing).
Certainly, digital solutions offer much in the way of addressing the security concerns asso-
ciated with computer and network monitoring and access control, but in each of the aforemen-
tioned areas the available techniques are lacking in some respect. We have already mentioned
that authentication schemes are vulnerable to the theft of digital tokens (which is not to imply
that the physical devices we seek to monitor are immune to theft, only that their absence is more
likely to be noticed sooner). Similarly, in other areas of security shortcomings arise because
of the limitations of the digital domain: determining the presence of spoofed or impersonated
devices for intrusion detection, demonstrably tying a particular device to a specific network
connection after the fact in forensic analysis, and addressing impending failures rather than
notification of failure in assurance monitoring. In order to address these concerns, we propose
making use of the hardware and manufacturing inconsistencies that cause minute and unique
variations in the signalling behaviour of every digital device for identification and monitoring
purposes. In this respect, our work embodies a certain set of signal processing techniques that
seek to make these variations manifest through appropriate application and interpretation.
Central to the security of this method is the belief that these slight variations are difficult,
if not impossible, to control and duplicate. This assumption is founded upon knowledge of the
variable tolerances of device components, which are introduced in the design and fabrication























Figure 1.1 (Top) A single period of the synchronisation signals from two 10Mb Ethernet
devices, aligned. (Bottom) The difference of the two signals.
variations in the overall electrical operation of the device. Simply put, because of these varia-
tions no two devices may be made exactly the same—hence their analogue signal characteristics
cannot be made the same, without substantial reverse-engineering beyond the reach of all but
the most determined attackers.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the amount of inherent variation (of the time domain) in the signalling
behaviour of 10Mb Ethernet devices. The two most important questions concerning signal
variation are its extent and consistency; i.e., how appreciable is this variation and is it stable
over time? This work is an attempt to answer these questions for the case of 10Mb-compatible
Ethernet devices.
While efforts are under way to apply our methodology directly to 100Mb Ethernet and
beyond, we chose to study 10Mb Ethernet and leverage it for use in identifying Ethernet cards
initially because of the relative simplicity of the electronic devices and signalling involved and
its low speed operation. As the electronics and signalling are less complicated than higher-
speed systems, we were able to understand the functioning of the devices and identify common
behaviour between devices of different makes, which aided us in hypothesis creation and testing
while attempting to identify differences and similarities in signals. In addition, as 1Gb cards are
required to, and virtually all 100Mb cards do, support 10Mb operation through autonegotiation,
6it is possible to force a higher-rate card into 10Mb-mode for the purposes of authentication
and then allow it operate at a higher speed thereafter. So long as the link is not severed, it
should not be necessary to continuously monitor 10Mb frames. From a complexity and cost
perspective, 10Mb Ethernet is also easier to analyse in hardware than other standards due to its
simpler modulation scheme, while capturing accurate samples of 10Mb-style Ethernet frames
may also be accomplished using lower resolution, slower, and therefore less expensive, ADCs
than would be required for higher-speed operation.
Wired Ethernet was chosen due to the low noise environment inherent in wired systems.
Environmental noise adds a stochastic and non-stationary component to the signal that must
be minimized as much as possible to obtain consistent measurements. On the other hand, noise
characteristics of an individual device, or component from a device, may exhibit distinguishing
characteristics.
Finally, we believed that if we should fail in discriminating 10Mb Ethernet signals, we would
have little chance of succeeding in the high-speed wired and wireless domains. However, we
should also note that in some respects profiling 10Mb Ethernet signals may be viewed as a more
difficult problem than that of higher-speed systems: the bandwidth is smaller and there are
fewer components per device—hence less opportunity for signal variability due to perturbation
by device components.
7CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Signal detection, classification, and identification was one of the major challenges in the
research and development of radar and wireless communication systems for a greater part of the
20th century. In particular, identification of radar, radios, and various wireless communications
became a very important and popular topic around the time of World War II [1]. Indeed,
research into radar detection and signature evaluation is ongoing in the military to this day
[2, 3].
Transmitter identification has also been of interest to the cellular and avionics industries.
Patents have been filed that make use of deviations from the carrier frequency in the transient to
identify avionics transmitters [4]. In the realm of cellular technology, the steady-state portion of
signals has been investigated for the prevention of cellular telephone cloning [5]. A time domain
weighted difference technique, whereby the differences between two signals are raised to an
arbitrary power and then summed form the fingerprint, was also proposed for the identification
of cellular telephones [6]. Additionally, several elaborate systems for the accurate and efficient
of collection of wireless signals for use in transmitter identification schemes have been patented
[7, 8].
Broadly speaking, we may divide identification and classification techniques into two cate-
gories (though there is some overlap between these two in the modulation-based approaches):
those that make use of direct measurements of analogue characteristics and those that note
digital differences made manifest through aberrations stemming from physical components.
The former category may be further subdivided along the lines of the analysis domain (time or
frequency) or the portion of the signal used in the analysis (transient or steady-state).
Transient analysis has been and continues to be the most popular: most early methods for
radar identification were based upon it and the preponderance of the work reviewed here con-
8tinues to rely on it. In fact, most of the modern, academic study of physical layer identification
rests upon the identification of radio transmitters undertaken by rf engineers in the 90s [9–11].
The techniques used to discriminate between signals and the types of signals the techniques
are applied to are different but the procedure remains the same: transient detection, feature
extraction, and classification.
In the area of radio transmitter identification, differences in the local extrema of wavelet
coefficients, obtained through the application of the Wavelet Transform to the transient, have
been used [11, 12]. Further, genetic algorithms were employed to determine which wavelet
coefficients should be used for this type of transient analysis [10]. In attempting to differentiate
same and off-model transmitters using a Sound Blaster 16 sound card for data acquisition,
wavelet coefficients were again employed but with neural networks for classification [13]. Mul-
tifractal analysis of transients, again using neural networks for classification, have also been
used to successfully classify different model transmitters [14]. Amplitude and phase informa-
tion from the transient envelope [15] and techniques using the maximal difference in amplitude
between the same frequency or range of frequencies of two different signals for classification
have also been put forth to deal with the identification of radios[16]. Accurate detection of the
transient is an essential component of many physical layer identification schemes to this day,
and was addressed in the context of radio transmitters by use of a threshold approach [14] and
Bayesian step change detector[17].
Using the physical layer for the identification of modern networking devices began with the
work of Hall et al. In addition to proposing a new transient detection method based upon phase
instead of amplitude, they were able to make use of the fractal approach proposed in [14] with
the phase characteristics of the transient to differentiate between Bluetooth devices of the same
make and model [18]. They extended their work to 802.11b devices by employing a Kalman
filter to classify the wavelet coefficients of the frequency, amplitude, and phase characteristics
of the transient [19]. A Bayesian filter was used to determine the final classification of a device
after transient data from ten transmissions were obtained.
Following this, we proposed a number of techniques for device identification in the wired
domain [20] and elucidated an approach to network security and assurance based upon the
9physical layer [21, 22].
In a reprise of their work on Bluetooth devices, Hall et al. made use of Hotelling’s T 2
statistics for classification [23]. The efficacy of this statistic in varying amounts of noise has been
subsequently studied for use in the identification of RFID devices [24]. Ureten and Serinken also
extended their earlier work on radio transmitter identification to 802.11b devices by applying
principal component analysis (PCA) to the amplitude of the transient in conjunction with a
neural network for classification [25].
A slightly modified transient detector and the same Kalman filter as Hall et al. employed,
but with several more characteristics of the transient (length; variability, number of peaks, dif-
ference of normalised mean and variance, max value, and wavelet coefficients of the amplitude),
were used to identify Chipcon 1000 sensor nodes [26].
Universal software radio peripherals (USRP) have been used to investigate the efficacy of
a steady-state approach, whereby a k-NN discriminatory classifier operates on either all of the
bins of the normalised FFT of the signal or some combination thereof [27]. This is the only
steady-state approach proposed, thus far, for the wireless domain.
While the identification schemes reviewed so far have focused on the physical layer exclu-
sively, a multi-layer framework for intrusion detection was recently proposed in [28]. Focusing
on 802.11b and Bluetooth devices, the maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform was used to
extract the transient; geometric unsupervised classification was then used on features extracted
from the transient using a sliding window, in the time and frequency domains. Higher layer
anomalies were produced using simulated traffic and characterised by a Hurst parameter.
Researchers have also investigated the possibility of using arbitrary rf radiation, instead of
the transient or steady-state signals that compose the data stream, to aid in the identification of
devices. These approaches include having clients measure the effects of multipath on specially
constructed frequency probes (i.e., the wireless channel itself is used for authentication) [29]
or subjecting devices (specifically, RFID transmitters) to sweeps or bursts of rf energy and
measuring the resulting induced emissions [30]. In the latter work, a modified form of PCA is
used for feature extraction and Mahalanobis distance for classification.
The affects of the environment on device fingerprints has also begun to be investigated. In
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[31], a wavelet smoothed IEEE 802.3 normal link pulse (NLP) was used to identify devices based
upon the mean squared error (MSE). The affects of cable length and temperature variation on
the MSE were then analysed. In the wireless realm, the mean and covariance of spectral Fisher-
features, derived from a linear-discriminant analysis of the relative distance of adjacent Fourier
spectra, from the signal transient were used with Mahalanobis distance-based classification to
identify Chipcon 2420 sensor nodes [32]. Tests were then carried out to determine the affects
of physical distance, antenna polarisation, and battery level on identifying the nodes
While slightly outside the domain of physical layer identification, it has been also shown
that it is possible to separate radio stations based upon the shape of the power spectrum [33]
and modulation characteristics of the signal envelope [34].
While the preceding works are essentially agnostic to the digital representation of the data
being transmitted, recent works have made use of deviations from ideal modulation character-
istics. In [35], support vector machines and k-NN classifiers were employed to identify 802.11b
devices based upon the average errors across all symbols of phase, magnitude, and error vector
magnitudes along with the I/Q origin, carrier frequency, and SYNC correlation offsets of each
symbol. Work was also performed on the Wireless Open-Access Research Platform (WARP) us-
ing some of the same features but with maximum likelihood estimation used for the comparison
of individual features and weighted voting for overall classification [36].
In the category of techniques that make use digital information only, researchers have
been able to remotely fingerprinting devices over the Internet by measuring their clock skew
through the TCP timestamps option [37], even when anonymisation systems are employed
[38]. In addition, passive (via probe requests) and active (via frame exchange) forms of timing
analyses can be used to identify 802.11b devices and access points [39–41]. Traditional TCP/IP
fingerprinting has also inspired researchers to craft non-standard or malformed frames and use
a wireless devices response to them in order to determine its firmware or driver [42].
Work in the development of physical authentication schemes has also led to the creation of a
physical token that implements a physical one-way function, which is verified using a statistical
hashing algorithm [43]. A physical authentication system was introduced in [44] that identified
FPGAs based upon the delay characteristics of the logic path in the integrated circuit used
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to compute 128 hash-based challenge-response pairs. In related work, it was suggested that
delays be intentionally added to the logic circuitry in order to improve security [45]. Using
these techniques it is also possible for devices and another entities to generate mutually known
shared secrets [46].
The central premise of PLIS is that reproducing device-specific variation is difficult and
not cost effective. Challenging these assumptions are recent works by Danev et al. and Edman
and Yener [47, 48]. These attacks can be divided by the equipment used to carry them out
(universal software radio peripherals [USRP] or arbitrary waveform generators) and also the
style of attack (replay of observed signals or creation of new signals based upon the features
of the observed signals). In [47, 48] the radiometric PLIS proposed in [35] was compromised
by both replay attacks and the creation of new signals; both the replay attack and generation
attack were carried out using USRP in [48], while [47] utilised an arbitrary waveform generator
(AWG) for the replay attack and USRP for the generation type. Furthermore, in [47] Danev et




The methodology adopted for the application of inanimetrics to a specific type of technology
is: (1) identify and acquire a recurring and ubiquitous signal, S, to serve as a ’fingerprint’, (2)
extract a set of features from the signal, L = f(S), and (3) employ a classification technique
to compare a test feature set with a database of existing feature sets in order to verify the
purported identity of the test subject. It is this last item that we wish to discuss.
For rather than following the best practices of the biometrics community (making use of
threshold or hybrid techniques to compare feature sets [49]) researchers, from all backgrounds,
working in the area of PLIS have consistently made use of rank-based classification techniques
that are only applicable under a closed-world model. This problem, though endemic, does not
invalidate much of the innovative and interesting work done in this field; indeed, rectification of
the problems related to verification will probably only result in a slight increase in false-accept
and false-reject rates for many works1. It does, however, point to the need to re-examine the
progress made in the field of PLIS over these past few years and its future direction.
In what follows, we detail the implicit assumption (that of a closed world) made by many
researchers through an examination of the techniques used to verify the identity of a subject
device. We have chosen—based upon historical importance, novelty, and prominence—what
we believe to be a foundational sample of papers to critique. In addition, we provide a list, by
no means definitive, of other works affected by our critique. Finally, we present a methodology
appropriate for classification in PLIS.
1In examining whether or not the radiometric fingerprinting system of Brik et al. [35] is vulnerable to forged
frames, Danev et al. implemented a threshold-based scheme and achieved results in support of this assertion
(see section 5 of [47]).
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3.1 The open- vs. closed-world assumption
The decisive factor in the selection of an appropriate technique for use in identity verification
depends upon the assumption of either an open or closed world [49]. These two world models
are delineated by who, in the case of biometrics, has access to the authentication system: in the
closed world it is assumed only users already enrolled in the system may present a biometric
identifier to it for verification, while in an open world anyone (even those not enrolled) may
access the system for the same purpose. It follows that in a closed world it is never acceptable
for the system not to map an identifier to a valid user, whereas an open-world system must be
able to assert that an identifier does not belong to a valid user if the identifier is absent from
the database. If PLIS are to be used for device authentication and network access control, they
must adopt the open-world assumption.
To illustrate the affects of assuming a closed world for a PLIS, consider a system of n-devices
which provides authentication services by verifying that an asserted MAC address maps to the
proper device based upon signal characteristics. The system would consist of a feature set
derived from each device’s signal, {L1, ..., Ln}, and a corresponding list of MAC addresses,
{M1, ...,Mn}. Operating in a closed world, an attacker need only submit frames using each of
the MAC addresses {M1, ...,Mn} until a positive response is received. It is necessarily the case
that one of the forged MAC addresses will be associated with some device’s feature set, as per
the definition of the closed world. The entire security of the system then relies merely upon
the attacker not knowing the MAC addresses of the devices associated with it.
In biometrics three approaches for comparing feature sets are possible: threshold, rank-
based, and hybrid [49]. Of the three, only the threshold and hybrid techniques are appropriate
for an open world. Thus, if classifier appropriate for use only in a closed world is used in
a PLIS, the closed world has been assumed, de facto. All of the PLIS under consideration
here either make use of a rank-based classifiers or hybrid classifiers in a rank-based manner
for verification. The efficacy, computational complexity, and memory footprint of a particular
classifier are secondary concerns and must, sometimes, be sacrificed to meet the conditions of
an open world.
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Again, our intent is merely to highlight the fact that in each of the works reviewed a closed-
world assumption has been made, and that while this does not invalidate the work as a whole,
it nonetheless requires a re-working of the verification method before the schemes can be seen
as viable for authentication or intrusion detection purposes.
3.2 Closed-world PLIS
For the purposes of this analysis, the feature set used and the nature of their extraction
is inconsequential, though this is not the case in general. If features are selected in such a
way that they are wholly dependent upon the underlying data used in classification (say, for
instance, a single data point or collection of points of a signal are found via searching to be
effective at discriminating a collection of devices) then the conditions of a closed world criteria
are met, which would invalidate the feature extraction technique.
For ease of interpretation, we chose to standardise the notation of the works analysed. In
what follows, Lji is used to represent the feature vector derived from the j
th frame of the ith
device; Lji (k) denotes access to the k
th element of the feature vector. In addition, a collection
of feature vectors from the ith device are denoted as Li, where Li(j) is used to refer to the
individual vector Lji . The feature vectors of frames that are to be tested by the system are
always accompanied by the subscript T.
Brik et al.
In [35], k-nearest neighbour (k-NN) and support vector machines (SVM) are considered
separately for identity verification. In the case of k-NN, the identity of a collection of frames
(which is to say that multiple frames are required to verify the identity of the transmitting
device) is established by comparing n-test frames, all of the same source MAC address, to










∣∣∣Lji (l)− LkT (l)∣∣∣ (3.1)
The test frames are then assigned to the device most frequently associated with the minimum
distance between test and training vectors, or in the case of a tie the device with ’the great-
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est cumulative similarity’. The procedure is much the same for use of SVM (simply replace
Manhattan distance with SVM in the above).
The defect of the approach lies in the fact that the test frames are compared to every
device in the system, with the identity chosen as the closet match between feature vectors—no
threshold is used to determine when the closest match is still too distant and thus a match
will always be made. The authors do mention that for the SVM approach such a threshold
could be established but fail to mention how this is to be effected (i.e., how SVM are to be
used in a hybrid mode). In fact, the entire apparatus could be simplified, at least for k-NN,
if a threshold-based approach were used from the beginning. Interestingly, this very idea is
derivable from an ambiguous assertion intended by the authors to prevent forged frames from
being considered by the k-NN classifier.
Before discussing the details of how k-NN and SVM can be used for identification at the
end of Section 3.4, the authors state that in order
[t]o guard against impostors injecting frames with forged MAC address [sic] in
the [identity verification routine], the server may choose to discard outliers before
running classification on the [test frames].
The authors intention, we believe, is that an outlier removal algorithm, used earlier in the
training process for k-NN, is to be used on the n-test frames, only some of which are legitimate,
to eliminate forged frames before they are used in the identification process. During the training














where d() is the Manhattan distance and m is decremented at each iteration until m/2 frames
remain. A similar procedure applied to test frames might possibly work, though it must still be
decided how far away from the average frames should be in order to be disregarded, but only
if the preponderance of test frames are legitimate—if most frames were forged then only the
legitimate ones would be discarded. A far better approach, one that obviates the need for the
cumbersome k-NN approach described above, is to compare the test feature vectors to just the
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training vectors of their purported identity using Manhattan distance, along with a threshold
for maximum allowable distance from the training vectors. In Section 3.3, we provide details
on how such a threshold could be established.
Hall et al.
In some of the earliest work on PLIS [19], Hall et al. utilise Kalman and Bayesian filters in
tandem for identity verification. An initial guess, P ji , that the j
th frame originated from the
ith device (this procedure is carried out against all of the devices in the system) is computed
using a Kalman filter for each of n-test frames. P ji is given by the filter
P ji (L
j











where L̂i is the average of m-training feature vectors, Li, and ΣLi their covariance. The
individual guesses for each frame and device are then used to determine the identity of the
frames by associating the frames with the device that maximises the output of the Bayesian
filter






for j > 0
1
# devices for j = 0
(3.4)
for j = n.
In the above, the closed-world assumption is made twice: once by calculating probabilities
for a single frame across all devices and again in making use of these probabilities to select the
maximum output of a Bayesian filter applied to each device.
Other works
We would also like to point out that several other authors also appear to assume a closed
world in their work [25–27, 36]. A valid threshold-based approach is given in [24, 30, 32], and
while [23, 28] seem to make use of thresholds, more information on their derivation is needed
before a final judgement can be made as to their validity.
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3.3 Open-world PLIS
In all of the papers cited, an inappropriate classification technique was used for verification;
a closed world was implicitly assumed through the use of a rank-based classifier. When the
world is opened, which is necessarily the case for authentication and intrusion detection, a
rank-based system unavoidably allows in impostors. As such, each of the these PLIS must
adopt a threshold or hybrid approach for verification.
While hybrid approaches are probably more powerful—sophisticated learning techniques
can be brought to bear on the problem of differentiating the feature sets of highly similar
devices—they incur substantial a memory penalty (more data needs to be stored: not only
training data and thresholds, but also a logical structure that reflects how the underlying data
for each device should appear independently and in relation to data from other devices) and
increased computational complexity (all test data must be passed through multilayered tests
and/or compared to the training data of several, if not all, of the other devices in the system)
over straight-forward thresholds. For these reasons, we have chosen to make use of thresholds
in our work [20, 31, 50].
In what follows, we present a threshold-based approach for identity verification that is
agnostic to the underlying feature set and appropriate as a drop-in replacement of the classifi-
cation techniques used by many of the above works. A threshold scheme is broadly and easily
applicable so long as a distance metric is employed in comparing the feature vectors of test and
training frames. In general, the distance metric is also immaterial, so long as it is only used to
calculate the distance between a test feature vector and a training vector from a single device
(this is the case for the Manhattan distance metric; even the Kalman filter of Hall et al. may
be interpreted as a distance metric of sorts, as it returns a probability of nearness).
Details of our approach are given in [50], but the procedure is briefly this: Acquire training
data, Li =
{
L1i · · ·Lmi
}
, for a device by extracting the necessary features from several captured
frames and use some of them (by choosing a feature vector at random or performing some
sort of averaging on a selection of vectors, e.g.) to establish a reference feature vector, LRi .
The remaining vectors are then used to determine a baseline for the device by calculating the
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for j = 1 · · ·m. Finally, using the baseline values, calculate a threshold,
thi = f (bi), that specifies the maximum allowable difference between the reference and any
future test feature vectors. If the distance between the two is greater than the threshold, the
frames are to be rejected as not having originated from the device. It should be noted that test
frames are only compared to the reference vector of their asserted identity.
Thresholds may be deduced experimentally or derived analytically through modelling of
device, signal, or feature behaviours; we have found statistical intervals [51] especially useful in
the former case. An important consideration in selecting a thresholding approach is deciding
whether a dynamic threshold is needed or a static one will suffice. It is essential that repeated
measurement of devices, made over the medium-term, be undertaken to understand if the
feature set changes due to outside processes or influences, such as multipath, interference,
noise, or temperature variation. It has been our experience that thresholds will need to be
updated to adapt to changing device behaviour.
If multiple frames are needed for verification the frames could either be averaged before
comparison or a distribution of the differences between test vectors and the reference could
be constructed and then compared to a distribution built from the baseline differences of the
device using a distributional comparison test, such as Kolmogorov-Smirnov. In the case of
multiple features, where distances aren’t computed using a vector-based metric, it is possible
to construct baselines for each of the features separately and, having compared the individual
test features to the appropriate baseline, simply count the number of features that fall within
the thresholds. If that number is sufficiently high, as determined by some other threshold, the
frame(s) could be accepted as legitimate.
Another possible solution is to employ the threshold determination techniques used in the
biometrics community, as exemplified by Danev et al. [30, 32]. Chapter 5 of [49] provides
an excellent introduction to this approach, but in brief the idea is to find a threshold such
that the false-accept rate of the system equals the false-reject rate. While Danev et al. have
demonstrated the viability of such an approach for PLIS, at least in the short term, it has been
our experience, having observed devices continuously for several hours, that all devices undergo
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constant, subtle changes that affect the fingerprint and therefore necessitate the use of adaptive
thresholds if the system is to identify devices over long periods [50]. While it is possible to
use thresholds based upon overall system performance to take into account changes of the
underlying signal, it is simpler, we feel, to replace them with adaptive per-device thresholds of
the kind outlined above.
3.4 Conclusion
We have attempted to review the methods used for identity verification in several physical-
layer identification schemes. Though never mentioned explicitly, the incorrect assumption
of a closed world was made manifest through the use of inappropriate classifiers in each of
the preceding works. Our purpose was not to denigrate these works, much less suggest that
their results should discounted; rather, we had hoped that by pointing out and offering a




The proposed approach to device-level authentication makes use of anomaly detection based
upon the layer-specific behaviour of the Physical and Data Link layers; our intent is the 1:1
verification of device identity and not the classification of devices. Verification is achieved by
monitoring the analogue characteristics of the synchronisation signal used in 10Mb Ethernet
systems and linking changes in MAC addresses to their corresponding physical representation
to, for example, determine whether the digital hardware address matches the expected phys-
ical signal. A profile, representing the expected device behaviour, is generated from training
data before identification of possible anomalous activity begins. This profile is used to de-
termine whether new information, in the form of electrical signals received from the device
being monitored, conforms to previous behaviour. Periodically the device’s profile is updated
to compensate for the expected drift in its performance.
In the present work, an optimal detector, the matched filter, is used to create profiles of
signals by applying the filter to various sections of a 10Mb Ethernet frame. The output of
the filter, as well as the expected deviance from this output, is used in the construction of the
profile.
In contradistinction to existing work, we focus on the use of the steady-state portion of sig-
nals to differentiate highly similar devices, where the decision to accept or reject the purported
identity of a device is based upon an analysis of only a single Ethernet frame. In an attempt
to create a worst-case scenario (viz., one in which an attacker is able to acquire a contempo-
raneously manufactured device), the cards chosen for our study were purchased in bulk and,
within each model class, bear nearly identical chipset markings and proximate MAC addresses
and serial numbers. We also present an adaptive thresholding scheme—which is readily appli-
cable to other physical-layer identification work—capable of capturing the signal variation seen
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during medium-term observation of the devices. While our methodology is comparable to that
of biometrics [49], it does deviate from the biometric approach during the evaluation stage so
as to accommodate this thresholding scheme. Finally, we carry out several experiments meant
to provide insight into which areas of the 10Mb Ethernet signal are useful for identification
purposes.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: We supply the background material under-
pinning the work in Section 4.1. Following this, in Section 4.2, we detail the steps necessary
to identify a device by its signalling characteristics using our methodology. The experimental
approach used to evaluate the efficacy this methodology is supplied in Section 4.3, with the
details of the Ethernet cards used and an interpretation of the subsequent results appearing in
Section 4.4. Finally, we conclude by noting the open problems and a shortcoming of our work;
future avenues of research are proposed to address these.
4.1 Background material: matched filters
Commonly used in receiver systems, the matched filter is said to be an optimal linear
detector as it can be shown by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality that the filter maximizes the
signal-to-noise ratio of a known input signal in additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) [52].





where A∗(ω) is the complex conjugate of the Fourier Transform of a known time-domain signal
α(t), P (ω) is the power spectral density (PSD) of the noise associated with an input signal,
κ is an arbitrary constant, and t0 is the sampling time of the peak filter output. This latter
variable is determined in advance as the filter output is maximised when the received signal
is aligned with the known signal, which can be accomplished through the use of synchronised
clocks at the transmitter and receiver.
By selecting an appropriate value of κ for the operating environment, and assuming AWGN
for the PSD, P (ω) may be eliminated from (4.1). For a given input signal, β(t), the output of
the filter, γ(t), at sampling time t0 for the Gaussian noise case, is found using the convolution
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where B(ω) is the Fourier Transform of the time-domain input signal β(t).
Taking the inverse Fourier Transform of (4.1) gives the transfer function of the filter, h(t),
in the time-domain (again for the AWGN case) as
h(t) =

α(t0 − t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
0, elsewhere
(4.3)
where T is the period of the known time-domain signal α(t). Convolving (4.3) with β(t)
expresses the filter application in the time-domain




Thus, the matched filter may be interpreted as the inner-product (in a discrete time formulation,
the dot-product) of two time-aligned signals, or a simple correlation.
It should be noted that we have used, and will continue to use for the sake of consistency,
a continuous time formulation in our discussion of systems, even though the implementation
of the methods we present occur exclusively within a discrete time framework. As such, when
giving interpretation or explanation, we will occasionally lapse into discrete terminology for
the sake of clarity.
4.2 The signal profile
We describe how the matched filter may be used to create a signal profile useful for identi-
fying a signal’s device of origin.
4.2.1 Identifying a common signal
In order to create a profile of the signal characteristics for an Ethernet device, a portion of
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Figure 4.1 Beginning of an Ethernet frame (dataset1): (left) noise and transient, (centre)
synchronisation signal, and (right) destination MAC address.
two distinct and necessary requirements: recurrence and ubiquity (i.e., the common portion
of the frame must appear at the beginning of each frame for every device). The preamble
of the frame or, colloquially, the synchronisation signal (named as such because it is sent
to synchronise the receiver of the destination device to the transmitter of the source device)
satisfies both of these requirements. This signal precedes each frame and consists of a 56-bit
sequence of alternating ones and zeros, encoded using Manchester encoding with a fundamental
frequency of 5 MHz, and is followed by the start frame sequence, 10101011, which is used to
indicate that the rest of the frame follows (Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2). The signal consists of a
transient, or turn-on, portion, which is the result of the transmitting circuitry of the sending
device powering on, as well as a steady state portion that serves as the actual synchronisation
signal.
As mentioned earlier, most work in signal identification has traditionally focused on the
transient portion of a signal. However, as the transient signal in 10Mb Ethernet is so small,
in terms of the number of wavelengths of the overall signal, we do not believe that there
is physically enough information contained in it for the identification of similar devices. As



































































































































The final portion of the Ethernet frame shown in Figure 4.1 is the beginning of the MAC
address of the receiving device.
4.2.2 Creating a signal profile
We discuss the three components of the signal profile and their purposes: the matched filter
(the anticipated signal); the filter output (used to characterise a signal); and thresholds for the
filter output (needed to identify and track).
4.2.2.1 The matched filter
Having identified a common and repetitive portion of the Ethernet signal suitable for iden-
tification purposes, an exact starting position and period of the portion of the signal to be
matched to must be chosen. We call this part of the signal the reference signal and choose
it to represent the known time-domain signal α(t). As per (4.3), the reference signal must be
reversed in the time-domain and shifted by t0 to be used as the filter. Here t0 is to be regarded
as the final sample point or end time of the reference signal.
Initially, the period and position of the reference signal were chosen as an arbitrary number
of points spanning the length of the synchronisation signal. For 10Mb Ethernet at least, we
have found this acceptable to distinguish between all but the most similar of signals; however,
we have also developed algorithms to determine the optimal reference signal for a set of known
devices. This type of reference selection would be useful for a network of homogeneous devices
(e.g., a lab environment in which all of the computers use identical Ethernet cards and were
purchased at the same time) that might be assumed to act as a representative sample, and
where, positing a worst-case scenario, an attacker would have access to like devices. For a
general study of the matched filter, however, we have selected a reference signal that includes
only the steady-state portion of the synchronisation signal, which is the same, to within five
sample points (5 ns), for each device. While optimally determining a reference signal for a
device, in relation to other known devices, may increase performance, our experiments have
shown that it is not generally necessary to do so.
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4.2.2.2 Filter output
The next step in creating a signal profile is to apply the filter to the signal used to create
it; i.e., convolve the filter with the portion of the signal used for the selection of the reference
signal. The filter returns a single value from this operation that serves as a baseline. This
value represents the filter response when a perfect match is made between the filter and the
original signal. If another signal is exactly the same as the original, we expect that applying
the filter to this signal will produce the same value. In general then, applying the filter to a
signal produces a measurement of the closeness of the signal to the original and, consequently,
the alikeness of the devices the signals were acquired from. If a signal from a different device
approaches the filter output value for the original signal too closely then we would be unable
to distinguish it from the device that produced the original.
Due to the noise inherent in any system, we cannot assume that even a properly func-
tioning device will output exactly the same synchronisation signal for each frame. Noise from
surrounding devices, created by a hard disc or CD-ROM being accessed or variations in system
load, and thermal noise assuredly cause slight variations in the signal from frame to frame. In
fact, with the aid of temperature recording equipment we have been able to correlate aberra-
tions in the filter output to variations in the ambient temperature of the lab. Furthermore,
due to the non-ideal properties of the Ethernet cabling—parasitic resistance, capacitance, and
inductance—even the act of measuring the signal on a different portion of the Ethernet cabling,
or using a different cable altogether, may affect the measured signal. This affect, however, gives
rise to the interesting possibility of detecting passive taps on the line, which often change the
effective material parameters of the medium.
To take into account the inherent variability of every device’s output, as well as external
factors such as temperature and system load variations, the signal profile must include the
filter outputs from a collection of signals taken over a period of time (the filter created by the
original signal is applied to the collection of signals and the response to each recorded [Figure
4.3]). We have found that only 25 sequentially sampled signals are necessary to adequately


















Figure 4.3 Filter output for 25 frames of an Ethernet device (cve 0.0011); the outputs for
frames 26–45 must lie between the dashed lines.
By examining the filter response for a device over a number of hours, we have determined
that a device’s synchronisation signal undergoes a continuous, if slight, change. In many cases
we have discovered that slight variations in the amplitude of the signals are the cause of this
variation. A subtle change in signal shape, over a period of hours, also changes the filter
response. By using the average of several synchronisation signals for the reference signal we
have been able to decrease the variation of the filter response; however, this often leads to a
corresponding increase in false negatives.
4.2.2.3 Thresholds
The final component of the signal profile is the establishment of thresholds that determine
the extent to which future outputs of the filter for a device may vary from the baseline. In
other words, the maximum amount of deviation in filter response acceptable before a signal is
deemed too different from the original must somehow be quantified (the dashed lines of Figure
4.3). In our approach, which is detailed in Section 4.3.3, these thresholds are deduced from
the distributional properties of the recorded filter responses mentioned in the previous section.
In addition, as the underlying signal used for profiling is stochastic, the thresholds for the
allowable range of filter output will indubitably change over time; thus, it is necessary that
some method of tracking output and adjusting thresholds accordingly be devised. As such,
we require that the next m-frames resemble the previous n-frames, where thresholds are to be
updated every n-frames. In this way—by taking into account past behaviour and projecting it
into the near-term, with a tolerance added for expected variation—a device can be adaptively
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tracked as its signal changes over time.
Moreover, by using thresholds to set bounds on future outputs, it is possible to adjudge
the origin of a signal on a frame-by-frame basis. For especially similar devices, however, it
may be necessary to forfeit unitary action and make the decision to accept the signal as having
arisen from the filter’s device of origin, or reject it as too dissimilar, using multiple outputs,
with the hope that any slight differences will compound and manifest themselves over time. To
this end, a distributional comparison test, such as the two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test,
could be used to compare the outputs of the filter when applied to frames gathered during an
observation period to the filter responses in the profile. If the null hypothesis is not rejected
for a given significance level, then the frames would either be transmitted (if they had been
queued) or continued connectivity be granted to the device. It must be said, though, that
this scheme is somewhat disadvantageous, in that it allows spurious frames through during the
observation period; as such, we have chosen to make the decision to accept or reject a signal
on a frame-by-frame basis.
4.2.3 Pre-processing data
In an attempt to improve the efficacy of our method, which we shall term the generic
matched filter approach for the remainder of this work, we devised several ways to pre-process
signals to improve our ability to discriminate between highly similar devices. Each of these
techniques seeks to amplify slight differences in signal characteristics that are too subtle to be
distinguished by the original method and are usually applied to both the reference and test
signals. The impetus for this work was based upon the observation that as the matched filter
operation is a sum of products (viewed as such in the discrete case), large-scale similarities
between signals can often overshadow the small-scale differences useful for signal profiling.
4.2.3.1 An ensemble of filters
For a given device multiple matched filters may be created by selecting a reference signal
for each portion of the signal identified in Section 4.2.1. Matching filters to the transient,
steady-state, and source MAC address sections of the frame gives a full characterization of the
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broad traits of a signal. An ensemble of filters is utilized, instead of a single large filter, so
that strong similarities in certain regions of the signal cannot overshadow smaller differences
in others.
Selecting multiple reference signals for each section of the signal may also highlight slight
differences; e.g., each transition, or pair of transitions, of the synchronisation signal could be
matched to different filters. In such a way the granularity of filtering could be arbitrarily
increased to take into account the smallest of differences.
4.2.3.2 Bandpass filtering
By analysing the spectrum of signals from a multitude of similar devices, we have found
that distinguishable differences exist in the frequencies beyond the fundamental frequency of
the synchronisation signal; however, as the fundamental frequency dominates other frequency
components, in terms of relative power, these differences are often obscured. Applying a band-
pass filter to the reference signal and signal samples minimizes the influence of the fundamental
frequency on the filter response by removing that portion of the signal altogether.
We chose to use a Fourier Transform based ’box filter’, as the output produced by Butter-
worth and Chebyshev type filters, particularly those of a high order, proved highly irregular due
to the high sampling rate used in acquiring the signals and comparatively narrow bandwidth of
the filters. Nonetheless, it may be advantageous to pursue alternative bandpass filters in order
to avoid the possible transient affects introduced by this method of filtering. To ’apply’ the
bandpass filter, the Fast Fourier Transform was applied to the input signal, X(ω) = F{x(t)},




X(ω), 2pifh ≤ X(ω) ≤ 2pifl
0, otherwise
(4.5)
where fl and fh give the lowpass and highpass frequency cutoffs for the bandpass filter, respec-
tively. The inverse Fast Fourier Transform was then used to bring the signal back into the time
domain.
Through experimentation, by use of several bandpass filters with increments of 1 MHz in
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bandwidth, we have determined that, for some devices, the 13–16 MHz frequency range exhibits
the greatest variation. We disregard frequencies higher than 20 MHz due to that the fact that
the power levels of these components approach that of the noise floor in our testbed.
4.2.3.3 Normalisation
The Euclidean norm of the signal x(t) is denoted by
x(t)





Normalising both the reference signal and signal being tested, according to the Euclidean
norm, proves advantageous for discriminating between signals that are otherwise different but
which, nonetheless, produce the same filter output due to the sum-of-products nature of the
matched filter. If the filter output for two signals differs, however, this form of normalisation
may decrease our ability to distinguish between the two, as the operation can be seen as
desensitizing the matched filter to variations in amplitude.
4.2.3.4 Trimming
Time domain trimming was investigated in order to minimize the affect of the signal am-
plitude on filter response; by eliminating amplitude dominance, variations in the shape of the
signal are made apparent. Analogous to the frequency domain trimming used in bandpass
filtering, time domain trimming removes the portions of a signal that tend to overshadow all
others by, for example, zeroing the signal amplitude for values greater than a predetermined
lower bound. Furthermore, by adding an upper bound, and varying the height of each bound-
ary accordingly, a window is created that allows for any portion of the signal to be scrutinised
by its shape alone. For an arbitrary signal, x(t), the trimming operation is defined as
x(t) =

0, llower ≤ |x(t)| ≤ lupper
x(t), otherwise
(4.7)
where llower and lupper are the amplitude thresholds; the operation is symmetric about the
t-axis.
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For instance, to ensure that the width of a signal matches that of the filter, the zero-
crossings—where the signal crosses the t-axis—could be examined by setting a lower bound.
We have found that time-domain trimming is most effective when only the signal samples are
trimmed, not the filter.
4.2.4 Using the signal profile
To determine whether or not a record originated from the device it claims to represent, the
output of applying that device’s filter to the record must fall within the current thresholds set
for the device. More precisely, consider a record, ri∗ , that has been captured from a device
asserting the identity of the ith device. The record will be accepted as genuine so long as the
following constraint is met
thi− ≤ max(fi(t) ? ri∗(t)) ≤ thi+ (4.8)
where fi(t) is the ith device’s matched filter and thi+/− the upper/lower limits, for the point in
time at which the frame was captured, of its filter output. The reason for the use of the max
function is given in Section 4.3.2. If the pre-processing techniques outlined above are used, the
record ri∗ should be prepared appropriately and the corresponding filter used in (4.8).
4.3 Experimental approach
The equipment and methods used to acquire the Ethernet signals for analysis are given.
Methods for calculating the false-accept rate (FAR) and false-reject rate (FRR) are discussed
along with details about evaluating the efficacy of the matched filter approach. In order to
determine the consistency, or lack thereof, of device behaviour over time, data was taken using
the same cards at three different times, using two different experimental setups. Based upon
these data, possible forensic application of PLIS are discussed.
4.3.1 Data collection
Two testbeds were used for the collection data. Each setup consisted of two PCs: one
to act as the Test PC (TPC), which housed the Ethernet card to be fingerprinted, while the
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Figure 4.4 Experimental setup for dataset1: (left) DAQPC and (right) TPC; Tektronix 3052
DSO oscilloscope not shown.
other, the Data Acquisition PC (DAQPC), made use of a passively tapped internal Ethernet
card to capture Ethernet frames sent to it over a crossover cable by the TPC. The earlier
setup (circa 2003, Figure 4.4) ran GNU/Linux on both PCs and made use of a Tektronix
3052 digital sampling oscilloscope (DSO), interfaced via an IEEE 488 card and Labview-6, to
acquire frames, while the later setup (circa 2010, Figure 4.5, 4.6) used a Tektronix 4032 digital
phosphor oscilloscope (DPO), interfaced via USB and controlled by MATLAB (see Appendix
A for the source of the acquisition routine). The first setup was used in the collection of the
data comprising dataset1 and the second setup was used for dataset2 and dataset3.
In order to generate traffic for the DAQPC to capture, the TPC was instructed to ping the
DAQPC. During a typical data acquisition period the TPC would ping the DAQPC 10,000
times over the course of approximately three hours. To ensure that only traffic from the TPC
was captured and that the measurement equipment did not affect the load characteristics of
the DAQPC, as seen by the TPC, only the receiving pins of the DAQPC’s Ethernet card on the
secondary side of the transformer were connected to the oscilloscope. In this way the DAQPC
could respond to the TPC’s pings and ensure that the data acquisition process didn’t cause
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Figure 4.5 Experimental setup for dataset2/3: (left) DAQPC and (right) TPC; oscilloscope
below DAQPC (partial view).
packet loss or affect the transmitting circuitry of the TPC.
Upon detection of an Ethernet frame (a simple slope-based threshold was used) the oscil-
loscope began to sample the signal at a rate of 1 Gigasamples/s for dataset1 and 2.5 Gigasam-
ples/s for dataset2/3. For the first dataset, the signal was sampled 10,000 times, for a total of 10
micro-seconds, while for the second and third datasets the signal was sampled 1,000,000 times,
for a total of 400 micro-seconds. Both oscilloscopes had 8-bits of resolution; however, because
of the DSO could store relatively fewer sample points than the DPO, dataset1 contained only
the synchronisation signal and the beginning of the MAC destination address, while dataset2/3
retained the entire Ethernet frame. Practically, this meant that more of the Ethernet frame
could be used in the construction of matched filters and more tests run on datasets two and
three than on dataset one.
Finally, the data collected during sampling was sent to the DAQPC via an IEEE 448 or
USB interface, where a custom Labview or MATLAB routine monitoring the interface accepted
the data and stored the values in a vector called a record, which was subsequently written to
disc. Each captured frame was stored in its own record; all of the records collected for a device
34
Figure 4.6 Oscilloscope connected to DAQPC for dataset2/3: (top) DAQPC and (bottom)
Tektronix 4032 DPO oscilloscope. The oscilloscope is connected to the receive pins
on the secondary side of the DAQPC’s transformer; the ground clip of each probe
is connected to the common ground of the transformer IC.
35
during a session are said to encompass its dataset.
The technical and procedural aspects of this process, for dataset1 (though the procedure is
much the same, differing where noted above, for dataset2/3), are covered in greater detail by
Jackson [20]. In what follows, unless explicitly stated, references to the data apply to all three
datasets.
4.3.2 Filter application
Having acquired several thousand signal samples from each device over a number of hours,
a filter was then created for each of the devices using the procedure outlined in Section 4.2.2.1.
The reference signal for each device was selected from, and the operation appropriate to the
variation performed upon, the first valid record of the device’s dataset. In the case of the
generic matched filter, for example, the reference signal had a period of roughly 6,000 ns
and spanned roughly the length of the synchronisation signal. Following this, the reference
signal was convolved with each record of its dataset, each of which may or may not have had
the same variational operation performed upon it, using an FFT-based convolution algorithm.
Convolving a reference signal with a record performs the matched filter operation for all possible
time-shifts; consequently, an output is created that is equal in length to that of the length of
the record. This operation was necessary, as opposed to the simpler one given by (4.4), because
the t0 of the reference signal may not in fact provide optimal alignment between the reference
and test signals—and hence not produce the maximum filter output—due to the fact that
an oscilloscope is not guaranteed to always trigger at the same point of the Ethernet frame.
This might occur due to triggering error or, indeed, signal variation, and is unavoidable as the
setup lacked an external trigger—i.e. the synchronised clock mentioned in Section 4.1—and
instead relied on simple level-slope triggering. Thus, the filter output at the point of actual
best alignment, γ(ta), was taken to correspond to the maximum of the convolution operation,
which should have occurred at or near the original t01. Having determined the filter output for




















Figure 4.7 Control filter output, cji (ta), for 10,000 records of an Ethernet device (cve 0.0011).
of the other device’s datasets in order to determine the alikeness of their respective signals.
More precisely, allowing fi(t) to represent the reference signal for the ith device and r
j
i (t)
the jth record of its dataset, the filter output, cji (ta), is
cji (ta) = max(fi(t) ? r
j
i (t)) for j = 1 · · ·n (4.9)
where n is the number of records in the device’s dataset (Figure 4.7). This procedure was
followed for each device (i = 1 · · ·m, where m is the number of devices) in order to obtain the
filter response of each record in its dataset—the so-called control response.
The filter output or subject response, sji,k(ta), of the k
th device using the ith device’s filter
is
sji,k(ta) = max(fi(t) ? r
j
k(t)) for j = 1 · · ·n (4.10)
Equation 4.10 is used for devices k = 1 · · ·m, k 6= i in order to find which devices could be
differentiated from device i. For example, Figure 4.8 gives the filter outputs of two devices
(Device 1, the control, and Device 2, the subject) using a filter derived form the first device’s
dataset. Following the explanation set forth in Section 4.2.2.2, as the filter outputs do not
overlap, the matched filter PLIS is therefore able to discriminate between Device 1 and Device
2.
1In point of fact, the triggering of the oscilloscope proved reliable enough—i.e. either signal did not vary
significantly or trigger jitter was sufficiently low—for dataset2/3 that the area of the signal considered for taking
the maximum between was reduced to ±50 samples around t0 (on average the maximum filter output occurred




















Figure 4.8 Filter output for 10,000 records of two different Ethernet devices using the same
filter.
Comment on time complexity
Using an FFT-based convolution in applying the matched filter to an input signal requires
two FFTs and one inverse-FFT, to wit
γ(ta) = max
(
F−1 {F{α(t0 − t)} ·F{β(t)}}
)
(4.11)
where α(t0 − t) and β(t) are defined as in Section 4.1. Each of these three transforms is of
O(n lg n) complexity. It becomes readily apparent that using such an approach with the pre-
processing techniques outlined in Section 4.2.3, which require multiple applications of the filter,
will become computationally infeasible in anything close to real-time. It is possible, however,
to reduce the matched filter operation to O(n) complexity for subsequent applications of the
filter after a single, initial use of the convolution approach.
Returning to the discussion of the definition of the matched filter in Section 4.1, it is seen
that by (4.4) the matched filter operation is reduced to an inner-product of two signals, and thus
linear complexity, if the signals are aligned. Letting ∆ = ta − t0 be the difference between the
actual sample point of maximum alignment (determined through convolution) and the sample
point (stipulated by the filter transfer function) that should produce maximum alignment. The






which is simply to say that the reference signal must be shifted forwards or backwards according
to the difference between the expected alignment point, t0, and the actual alignment point, ta,
before the inner-product is taken.
4.3.3 Threshold calculation
To summarise the discussion on the imposition of limits for, and tracking of, the filter
output in Section 4.2.2.3: in order to account for changes in signal characteristics over time,
the affects of which correspond to the variability in filter output seen in Figure 4.7, thresholds
were introduced for the maximum amount of deviation in filter response acceptable before a
signal is deemed too different from the original. Past behaviour must also be considered when
setting these thresholds, and so it is required that the next m-frames resemble the previous
n-frames, with an allowance for some variability.
If the distribution (along with its location and scale) of the filter output is known, it is
trivial to calculate arbitrary confidence intervals with statistical rigour to bound future outputs.
However, as all of these parameters must be estimated, prediction intervals must be used to
build thresholds with any statistical basis [51]. By the use of a two-sided prediction interval,
it is possible to state, with 100(1 − α)% confidence, that all m future outputs will fall within
the range of
th+/−(cj · · · cj+m−1) = µ(cj−n · · · cj−1)± r(1−α;m,n) × σ(cj−n · · · cj−1) (4.13)
where cj is the filter output for jth record of the control device, and µ and σ are the mean and










where t is the Student’s t-distribution. For the experiments performed the filter output for the
first 25 frames of a device were used as training data to predict the output of the next 20 (n = 25,
m = 20); specifying α = 0.05 to achieve 95% certainty estimates yields r = 3.397. It was found
that large, sporadic deviations do occur for all Ethernet devices, so a perfect acceptance rate
cannot be obtained unless one is willing to allow a certain number of significant deviations
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every m-frames or set r unreasonably high. As with any system with statistical variation, a
balance must be found for α that results in acceptable false positives and false negatives.
While (4.13, 4.14) are meant for normal data, and, strictly speaking, by use of the Lilliefors
test, it was observed that the filter output is not consistently normal (it exhibits a marked
tendency towards the extreme value distribution), as a practical matter it is sufficiently close
to a normal distribution as to obviate the need to apply a normal-transform (the Box-Cox
transformation, e.g.) or make use of alternate prediction methods (such as ARMA modelling
[54]).
4.3.4 Classifying filter output
The methodology used to evaluate the efficacy—i.e., the false positive and false negative
counts—of the matched filter approach is set forth. For ease of interpretation, in what follows
’false reject’ (a device not recognised as itself) and ’false accept’ (a device misidentified as
another) are occasionally made use of to mean ’false positive’ and ’false negative’, respectively.
4.3.4.1 Type I Errors
To determine the number of false positives for the ith control device, the first 25 of its filter
responses, c1···25i (ta), were used in conjunction with the procedure set forth in the previous
section to establish thresholds, which were expected to provide a false reject rate of 1% or less,
for the next 20 outputs. If the filter response for one of the next 20 records lay outside of the
bounds set by these thresholds, its corresponding record was marked as rejected and was not
used in determining the thresholds for the next 20 outputs. It should be noted that the last five
filter outputs used to calculate thresholds for the preceding 20 were used again for the next 20,
as 25 outputs are needed for training while only 20 are accepted per iteration. This procedure
was followed for the remainder of the filter responses in the device’s dataset. The false positive
count was then simply FP = nc − n− nr, where nr is the total number of rejected records, n
the number of records used for training, and nc the total number of records for the device.
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4.3.4.2 Type II Errors
Whereas it was possible to determine false rejects by sequentially applying (4.13) to each of
the next 20 filter outputs, false accepts cannot be determined in such a sequential manner, as
it cannot be known where to begin comparing the output of the ith device’s filter applied to the
kth device’s dataset and the ith device’s own output in order to find their intersection. Simply
comparing the distributions of the filter outputs for the two cases—by use of the overlapping
coefficient, say—would also produce an inaccurate false negative count, as the filter output for
each device was non-stationary and therefore not amenable to distribution fitting over the long
term.
Therefore, to calculate the number of false accepts accurately, it was assumed that the filter
response for each record of the kth subject device’s dataset using the ith control device’s filter,
s1···nsi,k (ta), where ns is the number of records in the subject’s dataset, was equally likely at all
points in time. More familiarly, an attacker had the presumed ability to select an arbitrary
record from the subject dataset and substitute it for a control record at will. The question,
then, is how many records, on average, would an attacker be able to pass off as the control
device during any 20 record period? To determine this, threshold values were calculated for
c26···45i (ta) (the first 25 records of ci(ta) as training data and consequently have no thresholds)
to check how many filter outputs of s1···nsi,k (ta) were erroneously accepted as the filter responses
for records 26–45 of the control device. This procedure was followed for each subsequent 20







where nla is the number of records accepted per 20 output threshold period. Thus, if a prepon-
derance of subject outputs were consistently misidentified as control outputs, the false negative
count will be correspondingly high.
4.3.5 Combining tests
When coupled with the matched filter operation, each of the pre-processing techniques
outlined in Section 4.2.3 produced an individual filter output, which could then be tracked
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according to the threshold regime described above. By combining the results of the these
filters, a multitude of what may be thought of as tests, which cover a broad feature set, could
be used to establish the verisimilitude of the subject record. However, if multiple tests are to be
utilised when deciding whether to accept or reject a record, a classifier combination technique
must be used to reconcile divergent test results.
While many approaches to the problem of classifier combination are available [55], most
were inappropriate for use in this context, as they required assumptions about the a priori
probabilities of the inputs, which cannot be known or even estimated. Instead, the chosen
approach for fixing upon a decision to accept or reject relied upon a bipartite approach: use
statistical methods to set a lower bound on the number of tests a given record must pass—i.e.,
be inside the thresholds established for the individual filter output—before being accepted or,
when the number of tests utilised was small, make use of a simple logical AND operation for
their combination. While the former technique was not needed in the present case to produce
good results, it is believed that the rationale for it, and the technique itself, might be of interest
to other researchers working in this area.
The statistical bounds approach differs from the one set forth in Section 4.3.3 in that,
whereas the distribution of the individual outputs is approximately normal, the distribution of
the number of test failures per record could not be satisfactorily characterised using common
distributions (due to the fact that the tests put forth above are self-evidently not independent,
and would thus be expected to, and indeed did, exhibit complex, correlated relationships). As a
consequence of this, one-sided distribution-free confidence bounds [51] are used. These bounds
require greater amounts of training data to produce an acceptably high confidence bound and
are not adaptive. Nevertheless, the technique could be used to calculate a conservative lower
bound on the number of tests passed per record, with 100(1 − α)% confidence, that at least
100p% of future control records should exceed.
Allowing k to be a sorted list, from least to greatest, of the number of tests passed by the
control records c1 · · · cn. The lower bound for the number of tests each future record must pass
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in order to be accepted is then k(l), where ’l is chosen as the largest integer such that’
1− B(l − 1;n, p) ≥ 1− α (4.16)
with B representing the Binomial distribution. It should be noted that while the number of
records used as training data, n, should generally be as large as possible, a certain minimum
does exist for which no value of l, for a given p and α, may be found to satisfy (4.16). This
is actually slightly advantageous in that it obviates the need to make discretionary decisions
about the size of the training data, as the minimum number of training records necessary to
ensure that at least 100p% of future records meet the lower bound for a certain confidence level
can be exactly calculated by increasing n until a solution to (4.16) is found.
Having established the threshold for the minimum number of tests to be passed by the
control device, type I errors and type II errors could then be determined by applying the
methodology of Section 4.3.4 to each of the individual tests, with the added step of ensuring
that the total number of tests passed per record exceeds said threshold. Which is to say, accept
a record as originating from the control device so long as np ≥ k(l), where np is the number of
filter outputs within the thresholds given by (4.13).
4.4 Analysis of results
The results of the matched filter methodology for signal profiling are presented for dataset1
(16 devices) and dataset2/3 (27 devices), with approximately 10, 000 records per dataset, con-
sisting of a combination of three different models (Table 4.1). The naming convention mXcY is
used to denote card Y of model X. Testing parameters are discussed and metrics indicating the
overall effectiveness of both the individual and combined approaches are given. Any mention
of sample points used in a test are made with reference to Figure 4.1 for dataset1 and Figure
4.2 for dataset2/3.
4.4.1 Variety and scope of tests
The aim of this work was two fold: to establish the value of a generic matched filter approach
to device identification and to measure the usefulness of the variations set forth in Section 4.2.3.
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Table 4.1 Details of Ethernet cards used for experiments (dataset1: m4c1–3, m5c1–10,
m6c1–3; dataset2/3: all).
Manufacturer/Model Identifier MAC Address Serial Chipset Markings Dataset
D-Link/DFE-530TX+ (Rev. E1)
m4c1 00:40:05:34:a0:31 B229237077076 DL10038D, 33098Q1, 315F 1,2,3
m4c2 00:40:05:36:01:15 B229237077139 DL10038D, 33246Q1, 316F 1,2,3
m4c3 00:40:05:36:01:19 B229237077140 DL10038D, 33246Q1, 316F 1,2,3
m4c4 00:40:05:35:75:40 B229237077075 DL10038D, 33098Q1, 315F 2,3
m4c5 00:40:05:34:a0:30 B229237077074 DL10038D, 33098Q1, 315F 2,3
m4c6 00:40:05:36:01:1a B229237077133 DL10038D, 33246Q1, 316F 2,3
Genica/GN-788
m5c1 00:00:e8:12:65:36 DB0211105319 0206TABEDC2736.00 1,2,3
m5c2 00:00:e8:12:17:db DB0211105339 “ 1,2,3
m5c3 00:00:e8:12:2c:85 DB0211105358 “ 1,2,3
m5c4 00:00:e8:12:61:53 DB0211105396 “ 1,2,3
m5c5 00:00:e8:12:6d:77 DB0211105389 “ 1,2,3
m5c6 00:00:e8:12:61:47 DB0211105364 “ 1,2,3
m5c7 00:00:e8:12:65:2e DB0211105349 “ 1,2,3
m5c8 00:00:e8:12:c4:a0 DB0211105317 “ 1,2,3
m5c9 00:00:e8:12:61:09 DB0211105326 “ 1,2,3
m5c10 00:00:e8:12:32:4a DB0211105404 “ 1,2,3
m5c11 00:00:e8:12:65:3e DB0211105394 “ 2,3
Netronix/37NB-12290-311 (Rev. 1.1)
m6c1 00:08:54:0c:37:5f 122901133CF05938 VT6105, 0325cd, 23B4002200 1,2,3
m6c2 00:08:54:0c:37:13 122901133CF05997 VT6105, 0325cd, 23B4001100 1,2,3
m6c3 00:08:54:0c:37:4c 122901133CF05948 VT6105, 0326cd, 23B4401200 1,2,3
m6c4 00:08:54:0c:37:42 122901133CD05949 VT6105, 0325cd, 23B4401100 2,3
m6c5 00:08:54:0c:37:10 122901133CF06000 VT6105, 0326cd, 23B4401200 2,3
m6c6 00:08:54:0c:37:55 122901133CF05939 VT6105, 0326cd, 23B4401200 2,3
m6c7 00:08:54:0c:37:54 122901133CF05940 VT6105, 0325cd, 23B4002200 2,3
m6c8 00:08:54:0c:37:0f 122901133CF05999 VT6105, 0326cd, 23B4401200 2,3
m6c9 00:08:54:0c:4c:bf 122901133CF06650 VT6105, 0325cd, 23B4001100 2,3
m6c10 00:08:54:0c:37:4d 122901133CF05947 VT6105, 0325cd, 23B4002200 2,3
To this end, a total of 526 tests were devised, the precise nature of which will be described
shortly, and then applied to the datasets. A complete analysis of the available data required
that each test be carried out on every one of the ∼10, 000 records in each device’s datasets
and that each device be tested against every other device using itself as a reference. Unless
specified otherwise, each test used the same portion of the synchronisation signal (475–6650
ns for dataset1 and 1310–7315 ns for dataset2/3) as a reference signal before the requisite
processing occurred.
4.4.1.1 Bandpass filtering
A total of 210 filters were used to exhaustively test the bandwidth of 0–20 MHz at 1 MHz
increments (Table 4.2). As the power of the frequency components of the synchronisation
signal beyond 20 MHz were slight (due to the presence of a 17 ± 1 MHz low-pass filter on
the DAQPC’s Ethernet card), it was decided that extending the bandwidth beyond this range
would contribute little as these small contributions to the filter output would be necessarily
overshadowed by the inner product operation. Both the reference signal and test signal were
filtered.
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Table 4.2 Bandwidths of filters used in BPF pre-processing.







1 2 3 · · · 20
0 1 2 3 · · · 20
4.4.1.2 An ensemble of filters
It was hypothesised that when a signal undergoes significant change so too does the cir-
cuitry used to produce the signal; this in turn may produce unique transients. As such, ad-
ditional filters were used to examine areas of abrupt change in the synchronisation signal (all
times approximate): the transient and synchronisation signal (300–6650 ns for dataset1 and
1200–7315 ns for dataset2/3), the transient only (300–475 ns for dataset1 and 1200–1310 ns
for dataset2/3), the transition from the synchronisation signal to destination MAC address
(6650–6830 ns for dataset1 and 7315–7500 ns for dataset2/3), and the transient with the syn-
chronisation signal and transition to the MAC address (300–6830 ns for dataset1 and 1200–7500
ns for dataset2/3). For dataset2/3 the synchronisation signal with the transition to the MAC
address was also tested (1310–7500 ns). Because the entire frame was captured for dataset2/3,
it was possible to extend this analysis to several other areas of the signal: the entirety of the
destination MAC address and part of the source address (7500–21515 ns), the transition to the
MAC addresses with the destination and source addresses (7315–21515 ns), the synchronisa-
tion signal and the transition to the MAC addresses with the destination and source addresses
(1310–21515 ns), and the entirety of the data from the transient to the end of the portion of
the source address (1200–21515 ns).
4.4.1.3 Normalisation
The Euclidean norm was applied to the aligned test and reference signals in each test. As
such, there were only 263 unique tests; the remainder were simply the output of the original
test divided by the product of the norm of the reference and aligned test signals.
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4.4.1.4 Trimming
Amplitude trimming, using increments of 0.25 volts from zero to three volts, was used
in two ways. Lower -trimming set the data values below a give level to zero, while upper -
trimming set the values above said level to zero. More precisely, for an input signal, x(t), and
l = 0.25, 0.50, . . . , 3.0 volts, lower-trimming was defined as
x(t) =







0, |x(t)| ≥ l
x(t), otherwise
(4.18)
These trimming procedures were applied to the test signal individually in one instance and
both the reference and test signals in another.
4.4.2 Results
Several metrics common to machine learning and data mining [56], as well as confusion
matrices, are used to present the results of the matched filter approach to device differentiation.
Both forms of presentation are necessary, as metrics provide only an overall picture of the
performance for a single device, while confusion matrices show the degree (the amount of overlap
between two devices) and direction (whether one device was being confused with another and
vice versa) of specific instances of misclassification.
Before proceeding with an explanation of the metrics used and the format of the confusion
matrices, it should be noted that, in the context of this work, a true positive (TP) is understood
to be a record rightly rejected as not having originated from the control device, while a false
positive (FP) is a control record wrongly rejected as not having originated from the control.
A true negative (TN) is then a rightly accepted record that originated from the control, while
a false negative (FN) is a wrongly accepted record that did not originate from the control.
Additionally, the false negatives and true positives for a given control were calculated with
respect to all of the subject devices; i.e. the individual FN and TP counts of the subject
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devices against a particular control were summed to determine the overall false-negative and
true-positive counts for each control.
The accuracy (A = (TP +TN)/(TP +TN +FP +FN)) precision (P = TP/(TP +FP )),
recall (R = TP/(TP + FN)), and specificity (S = TN/(TN + FP )) metrics are used to give
a reasonable account—at least when the metrics are interpreted collectively—of the overall
effectiveness of the classification system. Note: specificity is equivalent to the true-negative
rate of the confusion matrix.
Confusion matrices, on the other hand, are employed to provide a finer view of how well
the methodology performed in distinguishing control devices from individual subject devices by
juxtaposing the true-negative rates for each of the controls against the false-negative rates of
the subjects. In the matrices, control devices occupy the rows and subject devices the columns
so that true-negative rates appear along the diagonal with false-negative rates in off-diagonal
elements. Each row thus shows the percentage of the time the method was able to correctly
identify the control and differentiate it from the subjects. A perfect classifier would produce a
matrix where diagonal elements are one and off-diagonal ones are zero.
4.4.2.1 Generic matched filter
The confusion matrix and APRS values for the generic matched filter are presented in Tables
4.3–4.5 and 4.6–4.8, respectively. Thresholds based on (4.13) produce overly wide intervals for
the filter output, and as such were established for at most a 5% FPR (α = 0.05 results in
r = 3.397; see Equation 4.14) to achieve the desired FPR of less than 1%. As can be seen from
Tables 4.3–4.5, the TNR was sufficiently high (greater than 99%) while, at least for different
model cards, the FNR was nearly 0% for dataset1 and 0% for dataset2/3, though some cards of
the same model were difficult to differentiate. We attribute 0% inter-model FNR for dataset2/3
to the fact the time at which the oscilloscope triggered on the signal was used to constrain the
search for the maximum filter output (see the footnote in Section 4.3.2) for these datasets.
While the method failed to discriminate between devices of the same model in all cases
(as evidenced by the individual recall rates; especially for the m4 cards), the overall accuracy
(∼90% for dataset1 and ∼94%/∼93% for dataset2/3) was satisfactory considering that all of
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the cards used in the analysis were purchased in bulk, at the same time, with the majority most
likely originating from the same manufacturing lot (the serial numbers and chipset markings
given in Table 4.1 would seem to support this).
The choice to use such a sample was a conscious one, in that we were attempting to examine
a worst-case scenario. Even so, we would like to note that the lack of overlap between different
model cards results in a matrix that is relatively sparse. Combined with the fact that a
very large number of records were used in the analysis, almost perfect APRS values would be
produced if inter-model results were used; however, these would also be perfectly irrelevant
in our scenario. Accordingly, we have calculated APRS values for the intra-model case only.
The results and their method of calculation, when taken together, imply that in a diverse
environment—i.e., one in which a great number of differing model devices are present—the
generic matched filter would perform well at differentiating devices from one another.
It may not even be strictly necessary for a network to be composed of heterogeneous devices:
so long as the cards are sufficiently different from each other for the approach to work, the
device population could consist of same-model cards. We had hoped that distances between
MAC addresses and/or serial numbers would correlate negatively to the FNR, in which case
we might then be able to establish a minimum distance between these identifiers to guarantee
distinguishability. While this is possibly the case for the m4 cards (the sample size is too small
to draw definite conclusions), it does not hold for either of the m5 or m6 cards, as can be seen
by comparing the FNRs of these cards with the information found in Table 4.1. Perhaps cards
not examined in this work do, in fact, correlate in such a way. In any case, without assistance
from manufacturers, we must attempt to infer differences in manufacture time (and implicitly
behaviour) from the cards themselves. Also, we have, admittedly, not carried out a proper
sample survey, so these results should be regarded as preliminary at best. Note, however, that
an effective survey would likely require an auxiliary variable that is correlated with the FNR
to decrease the variance of the population parameter [57].
Changes to the data collection regime for dataset2/3 improved the performance of the
generic matched filter. Comparing Tables 4.7, 4.8 to 4.6 shows that increasing the rate at
which the synchronisation signal is sampled to 2.5 Gigasamples/s reduces the collisions of the
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m4 cards (1–3) and m6 cards (1–3) used in dataset1 to zero, though other collisions do arise
for the remaining devices in these model classes in dataset2/3.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.6 Intra-model APRS values for the generic matched filter (dataset1)
Tested Card A P R S
m4c1 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.999
m4c2 0.702 0.999 0.554 0.999
m4c3 0.681 0.998 0.522 0.998
m5c1 0.890 1.000 0.877 0.999
m5c2 0.890 1.000 0.878 0.999
m5c3 0.900 1.000 0.890 0.999
m5c4 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998
m5c5 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
m5c6 0.836 1.000 0.818 0.998
m5c7 0.901 1.000 0.890 0.998
m5c8 0.852 1.000 0.835 0.999
m5c9 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998
m5c10 0.919 1.000 0.910 0.998
m6c1 0.888 0.998 0.834 0.997
m6c2 0.874 0.998 0.813 0.997
m6c3 0.980 0.998 0.971 0.997
mean 0.895 0.999 0.862 0.998
Table 4.7 Intra-model APRS values for the generic matched filter (dataset2)
Tested Card A P R S
m4c1 0.918 1.000 0.902 0.999
m4c2 0.872 1.000 0.846 0.999
m4c3 0.974 0.999 0.969 0.996
m4c4 0.876 1.000 0.852 0.999
m4c5 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
m4c6 0.663 1.000 0.597 1.000
m5c1 0.916 1.000 0.908 0.996
m5c2 0.910 1.000 0.901 0.998
m5c3 0.970 1.000 0.967 0.999
m5c4 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996
m5c5 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
m5c6 0.917 1.000 0.909 0.996
m5c7 0.912 1.000 0.903 0.998
m5c8 0.913 1.000 0.905 0.998
m5c9 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997
m5c10 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997
m5c11 0.908 1.000 0.899 0.999
m6c1 0.898 1.000 0.887 0.997
m6c2 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998
m6c3 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996
m6c4 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996
m6c5 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997
m6c6 0.915 1.000 0.905 0.999
m6c7 0.966 1.000 0.963 0.996
m6c8 0.882 1.000 0.869 0.999
m6c9 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
m6c10 0.837 1.000 0.819 0.999
mean 0.935 1.000 0.926 0.998
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Table 4.8 Intra-model APRS values for the generic matched filter (dataset3)
Tested Card A P R S
m4c1 0.917 1.000 0.901 0.999
m4c2 0.879 1.000 0.855 0.999
m4c3 0.808 0.998 0.771 0.992
m4c4 0.875 1.000 0.850 1.000
m4c5 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
m4c6 0.663 1.000 0.597 1.000
m5c1 0.914 1.000 0.906 0.997
m5c2 0.911 1.000 0.902 0.998
m5c3 0.959 1.000 0.955 0.999
m5c4 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997
m5c5 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
m5c6 0.916 1.000 0.908 0.996
m5c7 0.913 1.000 0.904 0.998
m5c8 0.917 1.000 0.908 0.998
m5c9 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
m5c10 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997
m5c11 0.867 1.000 0.854 0.999
m6c1 0.899 1.000 0.888 0.997
m6c2 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998
m6c3 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996
m6c4 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996
m6c5 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997
m6c6 0.915 1.000 0.905 0.999
m6c7 0.965 1.000 0.962 0.996
m6c8 0.884 1.000 0.871 0.999
m6c9 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
m6c10 0.837 1.000 0.819 0.999
mean 0.927 1.000 0.917 0.998
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4.4.2.2 Combined approach
Though initially devised to provide increased efficacy over the generic matched filter, most
of the tests proposed in Section 4.2.3 were unable to better our ability to distinguish between
devices. Even so, the actual work of carrying out an analysis of all the tests was useful in
that it identified the areas of the signal common to all devices—with respect to the matched
filter—and made apparent those techniques and domains which should be explored further.
Exempting those tests that were effective for a single pair of cards, only the bandpass filters
(usually using non-normalised records) provided some advantage over the generic matched
filter. Interestingly, the bandwidth of the these filters differed by model; i.e., while a particular
bandpass filter may have been effective for, say, the m5 cards it could not be depended upon
to give good results for the other models. This would seem to imply, in the best case, that
different model cards exhibit model-specific deviations, with tendencies towards variation being
roughly constant across the model. Of course, this hypothesis should be tested by carrying out
a proper survey to ensure that the tests deemed effective are not merely artefacts of ex post
facto selection.
While the number of effective tests proved few, their use in combination—i.e., each record
was required to pass all of the tests to be accepted (a.k.a unanimous voting [55])—showed
a marked improvement over the results obtained in Section 4.4.2.1, with average accuracies
of ∼95% for dataset1, and ∼100% for dataset2/3 (Tables 4.9–4.11 and 4.12–4.14); specificity
declined slightly but still averaged over 98% for all datasets. It should be noted that the
increased accuracy for dataset1 is largely due to the m5 cards, while for dataset2/3 cards of all
models showed improvement.
dataset1
With the exception of the m6 cards, multiple bandpass filters were found to be at least
partially effective for each model—though the bandwidths of the filters overlapped in each case.
We utilised non-normalised and normalised filters (in the 6–16 MHz and 10–16 MHz ranges,
respectively) for the m5 cards but made use of only one normalised filter for the m4 cards (0–12
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MHz). It is significant that each of the m5 filters—and indeed all of the effective bandpass
filters for this model—excluded the fundamental frequency of the 5 MHz synchronisation signal,
where the majority of the power lies, but contained the frequencies near to, and including, 15
MHz, which is where the first harmonic of a 5 MHz square wave resides. This suggests that the
greatest signal deviations are to be found at the higher harmonics; however, as noted earlier,
due to the presence of a low-pass filter on the DAQPC, it was not possible for us to examine
these harmonics. The Ethernet card in the DAQPC is a 10Mb one, so it is possible that 100Mb
cards do not use filters with such a low cut-off frequencies, even in 10Mb mode. If this is the
case, we may be able to improve our results by examining the harmonics, individually or in
combination, past 15 MHz.
dataset2/3
We hypothesised that, considering that the synchronisation signal is short in duration,
relative to the rest of the frame, and as the performance of the filter generally increases as
the signal it operates on is lengthened, the portion of the frame containing the source and
destination MAC addresses could be used, along with the synchronisation signal, to eliminate
overlap between devices. To this end the source address was set (spoofed) to be the same for
each device in dataset2/3. Unfortunately, neither of the MAC addresses when used singly, in
combination, or with the synchronisation signal—normalised or not—were able to differentiate
more devices than the generic matched filter. While it is possible that a completely passive
implementation of the matched filter PLIS could also utilise the source IP, these experiments
with the MAC addresses indicate that individual device behaviour is expressed primarily in the
synchronisation signal. It is of course possible that tests other than an ensemble of filters (e.g.
bandpass filtering) would reveal differences in other parts of the frame.
The effective tests for dataset2/3, much like dataset1, proved to be bandpass filters. For
models m4 and m6 normalised and non-normalised filters with bandwidths of 0–10MHz proved
efficacious, while for m5 a 15–16MHz non-normalised filter worked best—these results conform
broadly to those for dataset1, at least with respect to the bandwidths of the filters if not
their normalisation or non-normalisation. For the 0–10MHz filters, the only component visibly
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different over the bandwidth was the DC component. We take this to mean that the amplitudes
of the differential signal differ by a consistent amount for each sample point; i.e. it is almost
as though one channel or the other were an exact copy of the other but attenuated/amplified.
Finally, we speculate that the reason the 6–16 MHz filter was ineffective for dataset2/3 (the
effective filters of dataset2/3 otherwise overlap to some extent with those of dataset1) is due to
a difference between the data analysis routines used on dataset1 and dataset2/3. For dataset1
the filter analysis was carried out using the entire record, which meant that a portion of the 10
MHz MAC address portion of the Ethernet frame was tested, while for dataset2/3 only that
portion of the synchronisation signal, which contains very little power near 10 MHz, aligned to
the purported device’s matched filter was used.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.12 Intra-model APRS values for combined matched filters (dataset1)
Tested Card A P R S
m4c1 0.996 0.993 1.000 0.987
m4c2 0.706 0.994 0.562 0.994
m4c3 0.767 0.992 0.655 0.990
m5c1 0.994 0.999 0.994 0.993
m5c2 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.993
m5c3 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.991
m5c4 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.993
m5c5 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.990
m5c6 0.995 0.999 0.995 0.989
m5c7 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.991
m5c8 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.991
m5c9 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.990
m5c10 0.990 0.999 0.990 0.992
m6c1 0.894 0.997 0.843 0.995
m6c2 0.880 0.998 0.822 0.996
m6c3 0.981 0.998 0.974 0.996
mean 0.950 0.998 0.927 0.992
Table 4.13 Intra-model APRS values for combined matched filters (dataset2)
Tested Card A P R S
m4c1 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.991
m4c2 0.999 0.998 1.000 0.991
m4c3 0.998 0.997 1.000 0.987
m4c4 0.997 0.997 1.000 0.983
m4c5 0.997 0.997 1.000 0.984
m4c6 0.999 0.998 1.000 0.992
m5c1 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.989
m5c2 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.988
m5c3 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.993
m5c4 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.989
m5c5 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.989
m5c6 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.985
m5c7 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.990
m5c8 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.991
m5c9 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.983
m5c10 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.988
m5c11 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.991
m6c1 0.998 0.997 1.000 0.976
m6c2 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.982
m6c3 0.998 0.997 1.000 0.975
m6c4 0.997 0.997 1.000 0.974
m6c5 0.998 0.997 1.000 0.976
m6c6 0.995 0.998 0.997 0.978
m6c7 0.996 0.997 0.998 0.974
m6c8 0.998 0.997 1.000 0.977
m6c9 0.998 0.997 1.000 0.976
m6c10 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.980
mean 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.984
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Table 4.14 Intra-model APRS values for combined matched filters (dataset3)
Tested Card A P R S
m4c1 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.990
m4c2 0.999 0.998 1.000 0.991
m4c3 0.960 0.998 0.954 0.988
m4c4 0.997 0.997 1.000 0.984
m4c5 0.997 0.997 1.000 0.984
m4c6 0.999 0.998 1.000 0.992
m5c1 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.992
m5c2 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.989
m5c3 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.991
m5c4 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.990
m5c5 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.990
m5c6 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.985
m5c7 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.991
m5c8 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.991
m5c9 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.983
m5c10 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.988
m5c11 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.989
m6c1 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.978
m6c2 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.981
m6c3 0.997 0.997 1.000 0.975
m6c4 0.997 0.997 1.000 0.974
m6c5 0.998 0.997 1.000 0.976
m6c6 0.995 0.998 0.997 0.978
m6c7 0.996 0.997 0.998 0.976
m6c8 0.997 0.997 1.000 0.977
m6c9 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.978
m6c10 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.980
mean 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.984
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4.4.2.3 Stability and forensics
In comparing dataset2 and dataset3 (Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.10, 4.5) we see that devices
that were difficult to differentiate in one dataset showed similar overlap in the other. As
dataset2/3 were taken one month apart, this suggests that, at least over the short term, device
behaviour is stable. With regards to differences in collisions between dataset1 and dataset2/3:
it may be that the device behaviour changed enough in the years between when the data were
acquired to shift the incidences of collision (e.g., from m5c6 vs. m5c8 in dataset1 to m5c6
vs. m5c7 in dataset2/3); however, sufficient documentation about dataset1 does not exist to
conclusively state that the card labels of dataset1 actually refer to the cards with the same
labels in dataset2/3 (that is, card m5c8 in dataset1 might not be the same as card m5c8 in
dataset2/3, for example).
The preceding should not be taken to imply that device identity can be established in the
present using past behaviour (i.e. thresholds for a device’s filter output the next day or week
cannot be calculated using present outputs), but merely that devices that were distinguishable
in the recent past will continue to be so in the near term.
Determining whether or not device identity is consistent in the long term or, for example,
whether a device can be reauthenticated after having lost and reestablished its connection to the
network, is not only essential if PLI is to be utilised for network authentication and/or intrusion
detection, but is of particular importance for forensic applications as well. For instance, if the
Ethernet frames related to an attack on a network are captured, and a suspected device later
obtained, the frames could be compared to test frames generated by the device using the PLIS
to determine whether or not it was likely that the device perpetrated the attack (of course we
would have to know something about the uniqueness of device behaviour for the population of
such devices, with respect to the PLI being used in the comparison, so that some qualifier, like
there is a 1 in 1000 chance that another device shares the same fingerprint, could be given).
With this application in mind, we used the generic filters created for each device of dataset2
against all of the devices in dataset3. Tables 4.15 and 4.16 present the results of this analysis.
The ’control’ response given along the diagonal was calculated in the same way as the subject
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response (see Section 4.3.4.2). With reference to the APRS metrics, we are first concerned with
specificity: for if a device can’t be identified as itself nothing can actually be known about how
well a PLI does in differentiating other devices from it. Specificity varied by model, and even
greatly within a model class. The m4 cards proved more difficult to re-identify than cards from
the other models, m5 cards were re-identified over 94% of the time, on average, while the m6
cards showed mixed results with five devices over 87% but three devices less than 50%. Because
of the low TNR rates for m4 devices, the average accuracy was only ∼90%. Taken together, this
implies that, at least for certain models (e.g., the m5 model, which had an average specificity
and accuracy of over 94%), forensic analysis could be effected legitimately.
Forensics and long-term tracking of devices are an open problem in PLI. For the matched
filter two possible approaches would be: increased retention of past filter outputs and sub-
profiles based upon different operating environments/conditions. In the first case, a device’s
signal profile could be endowed with a type of memory so that filter outputs could be put into
a historical context; i.e. given what we have seen recently from the device—taking into account
the last time we heard from the device—does the current filter output fit the profile? For the
second, profiles could be built for how a device behaves at different times of of day or under
varying CPU loads, etc. Filter outputs for newly arrived frames could be compared against
these different profiles to see if a match is found and if it’s a likely match, given the device’s
reported load and the time of day, etc.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.16 Intra-model APRS values for for dataset2 generic matched filters used on dataset3
Tested Card A P R S
m4c1 0.706 0.809 0.847 0.000
m4c2 0.684 0.804 0.820 0.000
m4c3 0.785 0.825 0.941 0.003
m4c4 0.995 0.994 1.000 0.971
m4c5 0.877 0.871 1.000 0.259
m4c6 0.670 1.000 0.604 1.000
m5c1 0.898 0.975 0.911 0.768
m5c2 0.923 0.999 0.916 0.991
m5c3 0.965 0.997 0.965 0.968
m5c4 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.979
m5c5 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
m5c6 0.938 0.997 0.934 0.975
m5c7 0.906 0.993 0.902 0.939
m5c8 0.916 0.999 0.909 0.986
m5c9 0.998 0.998 1.000 0.980
m5c10 0.983 0.983 0.999 0.824
m5c11 0.902 0.999 0.893 0.991
m6c1 0.930 0.940 0.986 0.431
m6c2 0.991 0.993 0.998 0.934
m6c3 0.963 0.960 1.000 0.628
m6c4 0.973 0.971 1.000 0.727
m6c5 0.920 0.918 1.000 0.197
m6c6 0.938 1.000 0.932 0.999
m6c7 0.943 0.985 0.951 0.874
m6c8 0.709 0.882 0.781 0.062
m6c9 0.998 0.997 1.000 0.976
m6c10 0.889 0.985 0.891 0.877
mean 0.904 0.958 0.933 0.716
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4.5 Conclusion
We presented a methodology capable of identifying Ethernet cards based upon minute vari-
ations in their network signalling resulting from hardware and manufacturing inconsistencies,
using an optimal detector, the matched filter. Several non-traditional applications of the filter
were presented in order to improve its ability to discriminate between signals from seemingly
identical devices of the same manufacturing lot. The experimental results of applying these
filters to three different models of Ethernet cards, totalling 27 devices, and over three different
datasets, were presented and discussed. Our results indicate that a matched filter can easily
discriminate between Ethernet cards of different models and, with sufficient pre-processing of
data, cards of the same model to an acceptable degree of accuracy, and that device behaviour
is stable enough for some models of devices to justify further research into forensic applications
for PLI.
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CHAPTER 5. DIFFERENCE SENSITIVITY
The entire basis of PLI rests upon the assertion that slight variations [of devices] are difficult,
if not impossible, to control and duplicate (Section 1.2. In light of recent work [47, 48], which
shows that wireless signals can be successfully forged, it is no longer sufficient to merely assert
the inherent security of PLIS. A brief overview of these works is instructive as it provides
information on not only how PLI can be attacked but also the hardware necessary to do so—
both of these pieces of information are necessary when considering ways to determine the
security of a PLIS.
Both [47, 48] consider two types of attacks against the PLIS proposed in [35], which utilised
the demodulation characteristics of 802.11b signals; in addition, a transient-based approach
for sensor nodes is examined in [47]. [35] was compromised in both works by creating signals
with the features of known devices and through replay of observed frames. For the former
attack, false-accept rates (FAR) of 98% and 75% were reported for [47, 48], respectively; in the
latter attack, the FAR for [48] was 55% while the replay attack met with similar success as the
generation attack for [47]. The difference in attack success rates can probably be attributed
to not only the threat models but the vastly different hardware used to model the PLI system
and carry out the attacks.
In [47] universal software radio peripherals (USRP) operating at 128 Megasamples/s and
controlled with the GNU Radio library were used for both the genuine and attacker devices,
with the attacker device being programmed to produce the features of the genuine devices as
measured by, and at, the PLI system (which consisted of an Agilent Digital Signal Analyzer
operating at 40Gigasamples/s with 8000MHz of bandwidth). The replay attack was carried
out using a Tektronix AWG 7000 (20 Gigasamples/s); the frames used for the replay were
captured at the attacker’s location using the PLI system. In [48] both the PLI system and
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the attacking device were built using the same USRP (14-bit analogue-to-digital converter
operating at 100 Megasamples/s and dual 16-bit digital-to-analogue converter operating at
400MHz). The attacker sought to reproduce or generate signals, which it captured, from one
of three laptops used to represent legitimate users.
In their analysis of [32], Danev et al. were able to successfully replay frames captured by
the PLI system over a wired channel; however, when a wireless channel was used the system
could only be defeated if the attacker assumed the genuine device’s physical location.
Based upon the character of these attacks, we proposed a general framework for determining
the theoretical limits of a given classification technique to distinguish between signals from
different devices. Having found the maximum and minimum waveform voltage values necessary
to distinguish two signals, it was shown that it is possible to define the characteristics of an
arbitrary waveform generator (AWG) necessary to produce a forged signal that is acceptable to
the PLIS. The work focused on studying the limits of the matched filter, though the framework
is general enough to apply to other classification techniques (although its application may be
more complicated).
5.1 Limitations of analysis
In what follows, all analysis and calculations are carried out with respect to a differential, or
reconstructed, 10Mb Ethernet waveform (depicted in Figure 4.1), which is found by taking the
difference of the signals captured at the receive pins on secondary side of the DAQPC’s trans-
former. While this is unimportant in determining how different the signals from two devices
must be before they are distinguishable, it does result in a loosening of the constraints placed
on an attacker. In the former case this simplification is unimportant because the matched filter
methodology assumes the reconstructed signal (we needn’t be concerned with the constituent
signals as only their difference is considered). However, for the latter case, the analysis ignores
the fact that in actuality an attacker would be required to forge two signals. We have made this
assumption not only because it simplifies the analysis by not requiring that we consider two
signals and also their difference, but also because the only data available to us is the differential
waveform and that acquiring the signals the attacker need forge would require that we take
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measurements on the primary side of the DAQPC transformer.
In addition, we also ignore problems of alignment and the affects of the channel, from the
perspective of an attacker. In the former case, this means that we take for granted that the
attacker is able to create a signal that results in the correct alignment; while the latter implies
that a measurement made at one point along the wire, or even a tap connected to the wire,
would yield the same results as a measurement made at any other point at the same time.
Again, this downplays the complexity of carrying out an attack but it also provides a worst
case analysis of the PLIS. We have also only performed a first-order analysis; i.e., we do not
comment on the interdependence of the AWG characteristics given in section 5.3.3. Finally, a
note about notation: a record is taken to mean a sampled waveform from an Ethernet frame.
When we speak of forging records, we mean that the waveform represented by the record would
be forged.
5.2 Constraint on signal differences
As laid out in section 4.3, for device k to be accepted as device i the maximum of the
convolution between the reference signal for the ith device, fi(t), and the records of the kth
device, rk(t), must fall between the thresholds th+ and th−. To simplify the analysis, we will
make use of discrete notation and view the matched filter in terms of correlation; i.e. we will
dispense with defining the filtering operation in terms of convolution and instead use the dot
product. As such, it is no longer necessary for the reference signal to be time-reversed.
In the most general case then—one that assumes no prior restrictions about signal alignment—
a record from device k must satisfy the following constraint to be accepted by the matched





 ≤ th+ (5.1)
where n is the length of the reference signal for device i, m is the length of the record from
device k, and ∆ may vary from 0 · · ·m− n.
Equation 5.1 tells us how different two signals must be until they are distinguishable. While
this may be seen as merely another way of formulating the matched filter PLIS, it is done to
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make explicit the relationship of the levels of the original signals to the thresholds used to
decide whether two signals originated from the same device (this is necessary for the analysis
that follows). In the case of other PLIS, similar work would need to be carried out, with the
difference that signal levels would first need to be connected to feature sets and then those
features to thresholds (in the matched filter PLIS the signal levels serve as the feature set).
From the perspective of an attacker, (5.1) can be satisfied in one of two ways: by attempting
to create a high fidelity copy of the waveform from device i used to create th+/−, which would
guarantee that the attacker’s frames fall with the thresholds (Type I attack), or by manipulating
an existing signal so that its filter output, using fi, falls with th+/− (Type II attack). Having
formulated the signal-level constraint under which two devices may be considered identical, we
can ask what sort of signal generation or manipulation capabilities, and information about the
PLIS, an attacker would need to produce signals for each attack.
5.3 Type I attack
Allowing ra to represent the attacker’s records and rg the records of the device the attacker
is targeting (the genuine device), both sampled at the PLI system, in a type one attack an
attempt is made to generate forged frames based upon genuine frames. Because the thresholds
for the genuine device allow for the variation of the genuine device’s filter output an attacker
needn’t produce perfect copies of the genuine device’s waveform. Our task then is to determine
how different the signal levels of ra can be from rg and still have the filter output of ra fall
within the thresholds established for rg.
5.3.1 Threat model
For the type one attack forged frames could be passed off in one of two ways: having
observed a frame the attacker could attempt to replay the synchronisation portion of the
original waveform but with a different payload, or they could construct a single frame based
upon the average of multiple observed waveforms and transmit it with a custom payload. If
the attacker wants to maximise the amount of allowable error between the forged signals and
the authentic signals they will choose the latter case. The proof follows.
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Following the procedure set out in Section 4.3.3, the thresholds for the next m records are
determined by taking the mean of filter outputs for the previous n records and adding, for
the upper threshold, or subtracting, for the lower threshold, the standard deviation of those
same outputs times some constant (see Equation 4.13). As the filter is the sum of products,
forging a signal that produces the mean filter output allows for the maximum, equal amount of
deviation for each sample point in either direction. The average of the signals used to calculate
the thresholds is just such a signal.
Allowing sg to represent those portions of ri−n,··· ,i−1g aligned to the reference signal fg and





= fg · sjg (5.2b)
The mean of the filter output for the n training records
µ(cg) =














= fg · µ (sg) (5.3d)
It is worth noting that although an infinite number of arbitrary signals (though not an
infinite number of signals falling within the guidelines set by the 802.3 standard [58]) could
be generated to produce a filter output equal to the mean of the previous n records, finding
the average signal only requires that an attacker observe n waveforms, align, and then average
them. Of course an attacker could not know the which frames would exactly constitute the n
training records; nonetheless a sort of moving average using more than n waveforms could be
employed to approximate the true mean as the filter output does not change quickly over time.
(The exact limits of such an approximation could be at least partially estimated by calculating
the rate of change of the width of the thresholds determined during the data analysis covered
in Chapter 4.) Finally, while the attacker can align and average observed waveforms, there is
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no guarantee that the resulting signal, even if reproduced perfectly, would be aligned to the
genuine device’s reference in such a way as to produce a filter output of (th+ − th−) /2.
Having determined the optimum signal an attacker would attempt to forge, we now turn
to the question of much the attacker could deviate from the signal and still make it acceptable
to the matched filter PLIS.
5.3.2 Signal deviation
In order to simplify the analysis, let us ignore for the moment the problem of alignment; i.e.
following the triggering of the sampler used in the system, the next l samples are automatically
used in the matched filter operation instead of trying to find that those sample points that result
in maximum alignment. All of the above concerning the optimum signal to forge still holds as
the average of these signals would still yield the average filter output. This simplification is
really not so exceptional as it may seem because, as mentioned in Section 4.3.2, trigger jitter
and signal variation proved so small in dataset2/3 that the maximum filter output was only
sought within 50 sample points of the expected maximum point of alignment. (In point of
fact, average deviation between the expected alignment, t0, and the actual alignment, ta, for a
device tested against itself for dataset2 was only 1.563 sample points.) Allowing ttrg to denote




fi[j]× rk[j + ttrg] ≤ th+ (5.4)
The practical consequence of this, from the attacker’s standpoint, is that the discrepancy
between the attacker’s average signal and the genuine average signal is greatly reduced, if not
eliminated, as finding the average signal no longer requires pre-alignment to some reference
signal but is instead carried out merely by an averaging of the records (this of course presumes
comparable sampling equipment for the attacker and the identification system). In what follows
we assume that the average signal computed (but not reproduced) by the attacker would be
equal to that seen at the PLIS.
Allowing savg = µ (sg), where sg are the next l sample points following the trigger point of
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fg[k]× (savg[k] +A[k]) ≤ th+ (5.5)
where A[k] is the per sample point deviation of the attacker’s reproduced averaged signal, sa,
from the genuine averaged signal (i.e. A = sa − savg).
The maximum and minimum allowable values for A[k] are found by increasing or decreasing
the signal level for each sample point until the dot product of the modified signal and the
reference signal equal the thresholds. Using an additive model for changes in signal levels leads














for savg[k] < 0
(5.6)
where A+ ≥ 0 and A− ≤ 0. An additive model was chosen because it allows for an equal
amount deviation for each sample point, no matter the signal level.
Another possible model is a multiplicative one in which more deviation is allowed for higher









where 0 ≤ A− ≤ A+. This latter model would be more appropriate if an attacker’s equipment
had greater accuracy in producing smaller signal levels than higher ones. We assume that the
attacker’s capabilities are agnostic to signal level and therefore use the former model. This is
in keeping with our conservative approach regarding the capabilities of an attacker’s hardware
(i.e. we want to provide an upper bound on AWG performance) and also accords with the
characterisation of waveform generating equipment by manufacturers as their metrics are given
so as to provide, if not uniform, then at least worst case indications of performance.
The solutions to (5.6) are given by
A+/− =
th+/− − fg · savg∑l
k=1 |fg[k]|
(5.8)
Thus, for the attacker so long as A− ≤ A[k] ≤ A+ the forged signal is guaranteed to be accepted
as the genuine device by the matched filter PLIS. Because the thresholds th+/− are symmetric
about the mean, |A+| = |A−|.
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Having determined not only the signal an attacker should attempt to produce to have a
forged record accepted, but also the how much the forged signal can vary from the ideal and
still be accepted by the matched filter PLIS, we must ask what kind of AWG would be able
to produce the ideal signal with an acceptable degree of accuracy (i.e. find the minimum
performance required of an arbitrary waveform generator to produce the target signal within
the boundaries established by (5.8).
5.3.3 Arbitrary waveform generator characterisation
An arbitrary waveform generator creates an analogue version of a digitized waveform. The
three core components of an AWG are the waveform source memory, digital-to-analogue con-
verter (DAC), and low-pass filter; optional components include scaling circuits, DC offset cir-
cuits, and differential outputs [59]. An analogue signal is created by feeding the binary values
of the digitized waveform (known as codes) to the DAC, where a stepped, or discrete, output
is generated; the stepped output is smoothed by the low-pass filter.
5.3.3.1 Parameters of interest
Because of the central role of the DAC in recreating the digital signal, we will concentrate
our performance analysis exclusively on it and assume the other components of the AWG to
be ideal. In any case, the parameters related to the DAC we will be discussing are always
given with respect to the output of the AWG, so we are merely overestimating the minimum
performance of the AWG. Additionally, for simplicity sake, we have not included the error
bands associated with the waveform generator’s output; an exact and full analysis of AWG
performance would require that these bands be incorporated.
According to [60], the most important specifications used to evaluate the dynamic perfor-
mance of a DAC are settling time, glitch impulse area, distortion, spurious free dynamic range
(SFDR), and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Not all of these parameters are relevant or their
impact calculable in the present case; in particular, glitch area will be subsumed under our dis-
cussion of settling time. In addition to these parameters, we will also discuss the impact of the




DAC resolution refers to the number of discrete outputs a converter is capable of generating
[61]. A DAC with a resolution of n-bits is able to produce 2n outputs within the range V+ and
V− volts. Assuming linearly-spaced outputs, the voltage difference between two neighbouring
outputs, which we shall refer to as the increment voltage, is VFS/(2n − 1), where VFS =
V+ − V− (the full-scale voltage). Analogue-to-digital converters used in sampling devices such
as oscilloscopes also have a resolution, but in this case resolution refers to the number of signals
levels they are capable of measuring.
Because savg is the average of n discrete signals, it may not be an exact multiple of the
increment voltage of either the attacker’s AWG or the PLIS system’s sampling device. In
actuality then the averaged signal an attacker would attempt to forge, sact, would be made
up of the closest multiples of the PLIS’s increment voltage to the ideal savg. Allowing m[i] to
represent the multiple of the PLIS sampler’s increment voltage leading to the smallest difference
for the ith point of savg, that is
argmin
m
(∣∣∣∣savg[i]−m VFS2n − 1
∣∣∣∣) for i = 1, . . . , l (5.9)
where VFS and n are the full-scale voltage and resolution, respectively, of the sampler, then
sact = m[i]× VFS(2n − 1) (5.10)
The average signal measured at the PLI system would not necessarily give rise to a filter output
equal to the mean of the previous n filter outputs, though it would approximate it.
An attacker need not actually require an AWG with a resolution equal to that of the PLI
system’s sampler to carry out a type one attack, as the attacker needn’t actually generate
sact but merely a signal that when sampled satisfies Equation 5.6 (where sact is substituted for
savg). Allowing s− to be the minimum signal and s+ the maximum signal, calculated according
to (5.8), that produces a filter output equal to th− and th+, respectively, the resolution, na,
and full scale voltage, V aFS , of the attacker’s must find some m between 0, . . . , 2
na − 1 for each
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i = 1, . . . , l such that
s−[i] ≤ m× V
a
FS
2na − 1 ≤ s+[i] ( .11)
In the analysis that follows, we assume that savg = sact.
Setting time and glitch area
The settling time, τs, of a DAC refers to the time it takes the DAC to switch its output
from one code and reach the steady-state value, within the error bands, of the new code [62].
As can be seen from Figure 5.1, the settling time can be further divided into: dead time (time
it takes for the DAC to register the code change and begin changing output ; slew time (time it
takes for the DAC to first cross the error band of the new output); recovery time (time in which
the DAC is acting in a non-linear manner—characterised as under- and over-shooting—that
may cause the output to fall outside the error bands for the new output); and linear settling
time (the time in which the DAC output approaches the error bands of the output in a linear
fashion). Glitch area refers to the time integral of the signal falling outside the error bands
during the recovery time (commonly defined for the worst-case code change).


















Figure 5.2 Settling time: optimal signal to use for attack, savg (green) with maximum, s+,
and minimum values, s−, of attack signal (red). In moving from savg[3396] to
savg[3397] an attacker only need reach s−[3397] by the next sampling period.
that an attacker’s AWG must be able to change from to savg[i] to savg[i + 1] before the PLIS
samples the i + 1 point; i.e. τs ≤ 1/fs, where fs is the sampling frequency of the PLIS
oscilloscope. However, according to (5.6) an attacker need only reach an output that is within
savg[i+ 1]±A+/− to ensure acceptance of the forged frame (Figure 5.2).
Specifically, allowing s− to be defined as above, an attacker need only make sure that at
each sampling point (i.e. every 1/fs seconds) the output of the AWG be more than s−[j]/savg[j]
of savg[j] for the signal to be accepted as genuine (Figure 5.3).
In order to simplify the calculation that gives the settling time which satisfies this condition,
we have linearised the slew and recovery times (see Figure 5.4). While this simplification
provides a very conservative estimate of the minimum settling time, again in keeping with our













Figure 5.3 Calculating minimum settling time: at time t1 attacker DAC is alerted to change
output from savg[1] = V1 to savg[2] = V2; DAC output begins to change at t2 and
achieves steady state by t3; at t = 1/f rs , the inverse of the PLI system’s sampler,
the output of the DAC must be at least s−[2] (red) to guarantee acceptance by
the system (Source: [63]).
Allowing τr to equal the slew time plus the recovery time and τd the dead time, the minimum




for j = 1, . . . , l.
Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
SNR specifies the power of the generated signal to the total amount of noise produced by the
DAC [61]. Distortion is excluded from the noise measurement by ignoring a specified number of
harmonics from the generated signal. Allowing s to be the signal to be generated by the DAC,
sgen the actual signal generated signal (minus distortion), the noise is then N s = s− sgen. Let

















Figure 5.4 Linearisation of slew and recovery times to calculate settling time. Output of DAC
is guaranteed to always be greater than purple line.
By definition savg is free of noise and distortion as it is the signal the attacker is trying to
reproduce. To determine the maximum amount of noise an attacker’s AWG may generate and
still produce a signal within th+/−, it is then necessary to add noise to savg until one or the
other of the thresholds is exceeded.










The minimum SNR an attacker need maintain is then P (savg) /P (N).
Distortion
Three distortion measurements are commonly used to characterise the performance of a
DAC: total harmonic distortion (THD), total harmonic distortion plus noise (THD+N), and
signal-to-noise plus distortion ratio (SINAD) [61]. For a DAC the THD is a ratio of the power of
the first n harmonics of a generated sine-wave signal to the power of the signal itself. Allowing
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Hsi to denote the i








where Hs0 is the fundamental frequency of s and P (·) is as above. According to [64] the first
nine harmonics should be used; i.e. n = 9.
For the THD+N calculation a similar ratio of the harmonics-to-signal power is taken but
with the total power of the noise of the generated signal, N s, added to the harmonic noise (the









SINAD then is the ratio of signal, noise, and distortion powers to the noise and distortion






i ) + P (N
s)∑n
i=1 P (Hsi ) + P (N s)
(5.17)
To calculate the maximum distortion allowed by the PLIS, we must first define what consti-
tutes distortion of the signal savg. Linear distortion of this signal would be of the form κ×savg,
where κ represents an arbitrary constant [52]. As the attacker may deviate from each sample
point of savg by as much as A+/−, we are dealing with non-linear distortion; specifically ampli-
tude distortion. The distortion of the signal is then simply the difference between savg and the
attacker’s signal, or A[i] as defined in Section 5.3.2. The maximum amount of distortion, D+/−,
the signal savg may experience and still be accepted as genuine is then simply the difference
between the signals, s+/−, that produce filter outputs equal to th+/− and savg, that is
D+/− = s+/− − savg (5.18)
To relate this to our distortion parameters we note that an attacker is actually attempting
to generate a signal made-up of a combination of sine waves of varying amplitudes and phases.
We must therefore calculate the allowable distortion with respect to each of the individual





maximum allowable THD of the attacker’s AWG for each frequency bin i within the bandwidth
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B of the (sampled) signal savg, is given by
THD[i] = min
(∑9
j=1 P (D+[i× j])
P (S[i]) ,
∑9




Calculating the THD+N and SINAD are not so simple as adding noise to the signal in a
manner similar to that used in the SNR calculation outlined above, for it cannot be known the
proportion of noise and distortion to use to bring the signal above or below the thresholds as
each may affect the PLIS differently (i.e. the PLIS may be more or less resistant to distortion
than noise, or vice-versa). An estimate of the THD+N and SINAD must then be specified
according to both the level of distortion and noise.
For simplicity’s sake, let us consider only the case of D+, that is the distortion necessary to
produce a filter output equal to th+, as the same procedure is followed for D− (the THD+N
and SINAD being the maximum result of the two). Allowing D = κD+, where κ is a scalar
between [0 : 1], to denote the amount of distortion applied to the signal savg, and D and S
their Fourier transforms, respectively. To calculate the THD+N and SINAD for the ith bin
over the bandwidth B, combine each bin of S, except for the ith bin, with the bins of D that
constitute the harmonics of the ith bin, and take the inverse Fourier transform of the resulting
signal. Using the procedure set forth above for SNR, add noise to this signal until th+/− is
crossed. The power of this noise is used in (5.16–5.17) with the distortion portions of the
equations calculated using the combined signal. This procedure is followed for as many levels
of distortion (i.e. values of κ) as are deemed necessary.
Spurious Free Dynamic Range (SFDR)
SFDR is a narrow-band measure of distortion/noise in that it is the ratio of the power of
the generated signal to the largest spurious frequency component produced by the DAC during
generation of the signal [61].
Because the signal the attacker is attempting to reproduce is composed of many frequencies,
we must consider a spurious signal for each. Since SFDR is given as the worst case across the
AWG’s bandwidth, we will assume that recreating a signal with n frequency components creates
n spurious signals with a constant SFDR (i.e. the ratio between the frequency component
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generated and the spurious signal is the same for each component).
In analysing the affects of SFDR on an attackers ability to forge savg we must determine
how great the SFDR for each of the frequency components used to generate the signal need
be for the signal to fall outside of the thresholds for the genuine signal. How these spurious
signals are distributed among the bandwidth of the signal has a bearing on the magnitude of
their affect. Are they for instance randomly distributed or are they a multiple (harmonic) of
the generated frequency component? Our analysis must then consider the number of frequency
bins used in recreating savg, where the spurious components are placed, and how strong they
need to be for the generated signal to fall outside th+/−.
Allowing S be an ordered list, from greatest to least power, of the frequency bins of the
signal savg and m the number of bins over the bandwidth of interest, B, select the first n bins
from S, for n = 1, . . . ,m, to create the frequency content of the attacker’s signal, Sa. Generate
complex noise, N , for each of these components such that the ratio N [i]/S[i] is the same for
i = 1, . . . , n. This noise should then be distributed randomly across the bandwidth of Sa. The
inverse Fourier transform of Sa is then taken to determine the attacker’s time-domain signal,
sa. The SFDR is found by increasing the ratio N [i]/S[i] until the resulting sa produces a filter
output outside the thresholds of the genuine device. Each time the number of components used
to create is Sa increased, the N [i]/S[i] ratio should begin at zero to ensure that the number of
components used to recreate savg produces a signal that results in a filter output within th+/−
(if not, the resulting SFDR would be −∞). This procedure could also be used to place the
noise on arbitrary harmonics of the generated signal to see which configuration results in the
largest SFDR. This then is the SFDR an attacker’s AWG must meet.
5.3.4 Results for Type I attack
Using the approaches set out above for each of the parameters of interest, we performed
an analysis using the device m5c1 from dataset2 (both randomly selected) to determine the
characteristics of an AWG necessary to successfully carry out a type one attack on the matched
filter methodology. Records 1001–1026 were used to ensure that the device was operating
outside the warming-up period noticeable in each device’s filter output. A matched filter was
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Table 5.1 AWG Characteristics for Type I Attack.
Parameter Value
Resolution 12 bits






created using sample points 2925–1794 from record 1001 (the same span used for dataset2/3 in
Section 4.4.1), with the remaining records used to calculate thresholds. The attacker’s signal,
sa, was found by aligning records 1002–1026 to the reference signal and then averaging. A
summary of the resulting AWG characteristics is given in Table 5.1; the code used to arrive at
these values may be found in Appendix B. A discussion of the calculations for each parameter
follows.
Resolution
For dataset2/3 a two channel oscilloscope with 8 bits of resolution was used to capture
the differential signals used in 10Mb Ethernet; however, as mentioned in Section 5.1, we have
performed the matched filter operation on the reconstructed waveform; i.e. we have subtracted
the data obtained on one channel from the other and used the resulting signal for analysis.
As such the data used for the AWG characterisation study should actually be considered 9-bit
data: the maximum of the absolute value of any of the binary sample points that make up the
waveforms was greater than 127 but less than 255; 8 bits, plus another bit for the sign, are
required to represent this data then. The y-scale, or voltage, increment used in the capturing
routine was 0.02 volts, which leads to an effective full-scale voltage of -5.12 to +5.10 V (binary
values for the sample points range from -256 to 255).
Using the method outlined in Section 5.3.3.1 would require an AWG with 12 bits of resolu-
tion and the above full-scale voltage to realise an approximation of the signal savg (i.e. a signal
within the bounds of s+/− [Figure 5.5]). The resolution of the attacker’s AWG must be higher


















Figure 5.5 Optimal signal to use for attack (green), 12-bit realisation thereof (black), and
maximum and minimum values of attack signal (red).
requires that the attacker produce a signal between s+/−. Reducing the full-scale voltage of
the AWG to better match the minimum and maximum values of the actual waveform (down
to say -3.5 to +3.5 V) would decrease the required resolution because, though the difference
between s+ and s− would not change, the voltage difference between each consecutive binary
value would decrease. Another consequence of the model is that increasing the sampling rate,
or including more of the Ethernet frame in the filter, reduces the amount of allowable deviation
per sample point (i.e., the difference between s+ and s− decreases), which in turn necessitates
an increase in resolution.
If the restraints of the attack model are lessened so that levels of savg are instead the nearest
multiples of ±Vfs/(2n−1), assuming Vfs = 5.10V , we find that the minimum resolution needed

















Figure 5.6 Optimal signal to use for attack (green), 5-bit realisation thereof (black), and
maximum and minimum values of attack signal (red).
only n = 5 bits (Figure 5.6).
In any case, no matter the resolution of the attacker’s AWG the final values of the savg
will be determined by the sampler of the PLIS. To ensure that the signal is acceptable to the
system it may be necessary to decrease/increase the resolution of the signal to that of the PLIS
and modify the resulting levels accordingly.
Settling time
Due to the slight difference between s− and savg at the waveform maximum and minimum,
the required settling time of the attacker’s AWG is very nearly equal to the sampling time of















Figure 5.7 Close view of optimal signal to use for attack (green), optimal signal with SNR of
∼28 dB (black), and maximum and minimum values of attack signal (red).
SNR
It was necessary to repeat the procedure given in Section 5.3.3.1 several times (1000 in
our calculations) and then average the results to arrive at an accurate estimate for the SNR,
as for any individual iteration the additive white gaussian noise generated could decrease or
increase the amplitude of particularly consequential or inconsequential (i.e. of greater or lesser
amplitude) sample points in a non-uniform fashion.
The maximum estimated SNR necessary to successfully carry out the attack is quite high
and results in a signal visibly different from savg (black lines, Figures 5.7 and 5.8). This
is actually to be expected as the matched filter is an optimal detector in the presence of
AWGN. This immunity from noise derives from its origins in communications systems, where



















Figure 5.8 View of optimal signal to use for attack (green) with optimal signal with SNR of
∼28 dB (black) to highlight extent of visible differences.
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THD and THD+N
Both THD and THD+N calculations were carried out over the bandwidth of 20.013 MHz
using nine harmonics, as per IEEE standard 1241-2010 [64]. Figure 5.9 gives the maximum
allowable THD per frequency bin to produce savg within s+/−. For an AWG the stated THD is
usually taken as the maximum THD across the given bandwidth; thus the THD of the attacker’s
AWG should be no greater than the minimum THD shown in Figure 5.9. To calculate THD+N
ten levels of distortion were used; i.e. κ = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1. Using the same reasoning as for the
THD estimate, the maximum amount of allowable THD+N was determined by taking the
minimum value for each distortion level and then averaging. As can be seen from Figure 5.10,
which shows the maximum THD+N as a function of distortion level and frequency bin, the
estimated THD+N is roughly constant across distortion levels. This merely reinforces the point
that the matched filter is insensitive to noise.
SFDR
In our SFDR estimation we assumed that any frequency components used to produce the
signal savg would result in a spurious signal placed at random across the bandwidth of the
AWG. The number of components needed to generate the signal under the restrictions of the
type one attack are substantially fewer than would be need to be produced in an actual attack,
as using too few components would result in misalignment (in our construction of an attack
perfect alignment is assumed). As such, the SFDR given is an average of signals produced using
n components, where n varied from a single component to every component in the bandwidth
of the sampled waveforms used to create savg. Even then the reported SFDR, which being
positive indicates that any spurious signal produced during the generation of an individual
frequency component can actually be of greater power than the component itself, results in a
signal that is clearly different from savg and would be distinguishable from a genuine signal
using one of the tests discussed in Section 4.2.3 (using the norm test, for instance, decreases
















Figure 5.9 Minimum THD, measured with respect to carrier, necessary to produce attack























Figure 5.10 Minimum THD+N, measured with respect to carrier (left-to-right, scale is
10MHz)and distortion level (front-to-back, scale is [0:1]), necessary to produce
attack signal guaranteed to be accepted by PLIS.
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5.4 Type II attack
In a type two attack an attacker is not seeking to produce a high-fidelity copy of a signal
from a valid device but rather, in the case of the matched filter, attempts to manipulate the
signal generated by their device to produce an output within the thresholds for a device already
enrolled in the PLIS system. The only limitation the attacker faces is that the manipulated
signal must behave according to the standard; i.e. the voltage levels, signal transitions, etc are
in accordance with those specified in [58].
To carry out such an attack, however, requires more knowledge of the PLIS and associated
target device than a type one attack. Whereas a type one attack can be carried out simply
by observing frames from the targeted device, in a type two attack the attacker must possess
both the device’s reference signal and thresholds for future outputs to be able to construct
their signal. By knowing these, an attacker can manipulate their signal, in whole or in part, to
produce a filter output falling within the thresholds for the device.
While the character of the manipulation is specific to the PLIS and its underlying clas-
sification technique, for the matched filter methodology, knowing that it is a sum-of-squares
operation and as a simple demonstration, an attacker would simply need to amplify or attenuate




ft[k]× (sa[k]×A) ≤ th+ (5.20)
where ft is the reference signal for the targeted device, th+/th− the thresholds for its filter
outputs for the next m records, and A is the amount of amplification/attenuation applied to
the signal.
As a practical matter, which follows the reasoning set forth in Section 5.3.1, an attacker
would seek to produce a filter output of (th+ − th−) /2. The amount of amplification/attenu-
ation needed to satisfy (5.20) is then given by
A =
(th+ − th−) /2
ft · sa (5.21)
As no amplifier or attenuator can be made to have a flat response over all frequencies,
an analysis similar to that carried out in Section 5.3.3, involving the maximum amount of
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allowable deviation of the constant A for each sample point, say, would need to be carried out
to determine the type of technology an attacker need employ to perpetrate the attack.
5.5 Conclusion
We have delineated, and described the information necessary to carry out, two types of
attacks against PLIS. For the first type of attack, in addition to having proved the optimal
signal for the attacker to construct, we provided the parameters needed to define the type
of hardware necessary to produce this signal and a methodology for determining the values
of those parameters. These parameters characterise the performance of an AWG needed to
successfully defeat a PLIS, and can be taken as a sort of metric indicating the security of
a given PLIS: if the parameters indicate that very high-end equipment is required then the
number of attackers will be constrained by economics; it may even be possible that no such
equipment that satisfies the parameters exists at the present time, in which case it may be
concluded that the PLIS under examination is at least temporarily secure against the type one
attack.
When designing a PLIS system, then, the classification technique should be chosen so as to
be as sensitive as possible to these parameters, so that it may be resistant to forged signals, as
well as its ability to differentiate between a population of devices. It is also possible,though,
that while a classifier is theoretically sensitive enough to distinguish between an actual signal
and the most high fidelity forgery, all Ethernet devices may exhibit an inherent amount of
variation in their signals, from frame-to-frame, that is greater than the minimal difference that
can be produced between authentic and forged signals. Such an occurrence would render a
high sensitivity to the parameters laid out above inconsequential.
Having applied the methodology to the matched filter, we find that the threat model is
biased too much towards the attacker and that the analytical portion of the methodology
should be replaced by simulations. The main deficiency of the model is that optimum alignment
between the attacker’s signal and the matched filter is assumed. This makes the PLIS appear
much weaker than it actually is, as heavily distorted and noisy signals can be created, given a
priori alignment, that satisfy the thresholds but would actually align properly.
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The boundaries for the maximum amount of deviation per sample point discussed in Section
5.3.2 are too strict, in that signals having an equal number of sample points of the same
magnitude above and below these boundaries, for example, would be accepted by a PLIS, as
illustrated by our discussion of resolution in Section 5.3.4. A more accurate estimation of the
parameters could be obtained by first selecting a realisable sa—e.g. having calculated savg
determine the minimum bit resolution for it to be accepted by the PLIS—and then performing
simulations using this signal to determine the remaining parameters. By replacing an analytical
approach with one based mostly on simulation, we would also be able to relax the requirement
of perfect alignment. This would, however, require that modelling for the different types of
noise and distortion be specified. For example, should the distortion used in THD calculations
be random (i.e. the magnitude and signs of the real and imaginary components are randomly
generated) or is there a more exact between the harmonics?
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CHAPTER 6. POPULATION SENSITIVITY
The population sensitivity of a classifier sets a theoretical upper bound on the number
of devices it is capable of distinguishing between. Should that bound be substantially lower
than the total device population, the classifier would be unsuitable for deployment as collisions
between cards would be inevitable. In this chapter we show how the population sensitivity of
the matched filter methodology can be estimated using theoretical maximum and minimum
filter outputs derived from the 802.3 standard and the measured variance of filter outputs.
6.1 Matched filter population sensitivity
From the discussion of the matched filter methodology in Section 4.2.2, we know that for two
devices to be distinguished the thresholds computed for their filter outputs must not overlap
(this is illustrated in Figure 4.8). Let us assume the difference, denoted by δ, between the
upper and lower thresholds, thi+/−, for all i = 1 . . . n devices are identical. This is not to say
that thi+/− are the same for every devices but only that the difference, th
i
+− thi−, is. (Which is
to say, in reference to Equation 4.13, the filter outputs for each device, while having a different
mean, would share the same standard deviation.) Furthermore, assume that c+ and c− are,
respectively, the maximum and minimum filter outputs possible. The number of devices we
would be able to distinguish would then depend on how many times the difference between c+
and c− was divisible by δ, i.e.




In graphical terms, we wish to know how many times the space between c+ and c− may be










Figure 6.1 Graphical representation of population sensitivity estimation. Partitioning space
between c+ (blue) and c− (red) by thresholds of width δ (green-to-green) allows
the classifier to distinguish up to five devices.
In the determination of th+/− and c+/−, we must take into account that the output of the
matched filter and the thresholds used to identify devices are functions of the sample frequency
and bit resolution of the oscilloscope used to capture signals and the underlying variability of
that signal.
The IEEE 802.3 standard [58] sets forth the minimum voltage, V−, and maximum voltage,
V+, values of the waveform for each bit value, which in Manchester encoding consists of a
transition or lack thereof (Figure 6.2). Thus a continuous-time representation of the upper
(lower) limits of, say, the synchronisation signal can be constructed from V+ (V−) by appending
copies of V+ (V−), or its inversion, to signify a lack of transition, to itself in the correct pattern
to produce the 56-bit sequence of alternating ones and zeros, followed by 10101011, that makes
up the signal.
These synthesized continuous-time synchronisation signals need to be made discrete in
voltage and time according to the resolution and sampling frequency of the oscilloscope used in
the PLI system. Allowing s+ and s− to denote the maximum and minimum discretized versions
of the synchronization signals, we then construct matched filters for the upper and lower voltage
ranges. If spf and spl give the first and last sample points of the span of the synchronisation
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Figure 6.2 Voltage and timing limits of 10Mb Ethernet signal; differential output, half of a
bit period (Source: [58]).
are given by c+ = s+[spf : spl] · s+[spf : spl] and c− = s−[spf : spl] · s−[spf : spl], respectively.
For the second part of (6.1), the difference between the thresholds, δ, is calculated by first
creating matched filters for each of the devices in our dataset(s) using sample points spf through
spl of their reference records (these may need to be adjusted slightly on a per-device basis to
correspond to the voltage levels given by s+[spf : spl] and s−[spf : spl]). Having applied these
filters to each device to determine its control response, we take the average of the difference
between thresholds calculated for each 20 record interval (which are found by following the
procedure set forth in Section 4.3.3) for each device. By selecting the smallest and largest
average difference, δmax and δmin, respectively, from all the devices, we are able to establish a
range for the number of cards the matched filter is capable of distinguishing between
c+ − c−
δmax
≤ number of devices ≤ c+ − c−
δmin
(6.2)
We should note that the 802.3 standard actually sets limits (pictured above) on the dif-
ferential signal at the output (secondary side of transformer) of the transmitter but that our
experimental setup currently measures the signal on the secondary side of the receiver’s trans-
former. Therefore, the records in our datasets would need to scaled appropriately (amplification
or attenuation of the signal would depend on the ratio of the transformer windings at the re-
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ceiver) before δ could be calculated.
6.2 Conclusion
We have outlined a method by which it is possible to estimate an upper bound for the
number of devices the matched filter methodology, or indeed any PLIS making use of two-
sided thresholds and operating on a signal(s) with constraints set on its electrical behaviour,
is capable of distinguishing between. We say that we have provided an upper bound for two
reasons. The first being that devices in practice devices may operate within bounds much
narrower than the standard prescribes or perhaps only a multitude of sub-ranges. Secondly,
our method implicitly assumes that any signal within s+ and s− is realisable; this allows for
signals of arbitrary bandwidth and resolution.
The first of these points could be investigated empirically by studying a statistically sig-
nificant quantity of devices—of different models, date of manufacture, and under varying
conditions—to determine how manufactured devices behave. The second requires that only
signals within a limited bandwidth and resolution be considered (i.e. the intervening signals
should sampled at the PLI system’s sampling frequency and resolution). Having calculated the
number signals possible within PLI system’s bandwidth and resolution, (6.2) could be scaled
appropriately.
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CHAPTER 7. ORIGIN OF VARIATION
In this chapter we set forth a methodology that allows one to determine whether or not a
particular device component causes, or contributes significantly to, the differences in signalling
behaviour between cards that allow for their identification.
7.1 Modelling components
When we speak of modelling a component or components of a device, we mean that we wish
to determine what the output—either the voltage, current, or both—of said component(s) will
be given a certain input voltage or current. Component behaviour may be captured in one of
two ways: using a lumped, or discrete, circuit model or by viewing the component of as a kind
of black box, wherein an input simply produces an output without explanation.
A discrete model consists of resistors, inductors, and capacitors arranged in such a way
so as to mimic the response of the component to an input. Each of these discrete elements
accounts for how energy is accounted for in the component; electrical energy is represented
by capacitance, magnetic energy by inductors, and dissipated power by resistors [65]. Having
constructed such a model, measurements of the component being modelled must be carried out
in such a way as to reveal the values of elements used in the model. These types of models
are advantageous in that not only can they provide closed form solutions for the output, but
they also allow us to think about the inner-workings of the component using well understood
processes (i.e. how the different circuit elements used to model the component interact, etc).
The black box, or port, model of a component specifies only the port characteristics of
the device—i.e. it only indicates what the voltage/current will be at one port given a volt-
age/current applied at another—but not why this is so. While this model may not explain the
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Figure 7.1 Depiction of a two-port model for a component (input voltage/current denoted
by V 1/I 1 and output voltage/current by V 2/I 2). Note: it is assumed that
voltage/current measurements are carried out at device terminals.
behaviour of a component, it does capture the behaviour of a component precisely, within the
limits of the measured inputs/outputs and under the assumption of linearity.
In a two-port model (Figure 7.1) an input voltage, V1, and current, I1 are related to the
output voltage, V2, and current, I2 via linear combination. Given four variables, there are
six ways to choose two dependent and two independent variables; these six choices represent
the possible two-port models (also called parameters) we must choose from. (It is actually
slightly more complicated than this as we must choose which dependent variable is be written
first. Furthermore, linear combinations of independent variables with linear combinations of
dependent variables further increases the number of possible equations to infinity. Refer to
[65] for a detailed discussion.) The parameter type chosen usually depends on how multiple
two-port models are to be connected [66].
Before proceeding with our discussion of how a two-port model of a component can be
constructed in order to determine the influence the component has on the unique behaviour
of the device, it should be noted that if the operating frequency of the component being
modelled is is high, as it is in networking technologies beyond 10Mb Ethernet, then it may be
necessary to use two-port models where the independent/dependent variables are themselves
linear combinations of independent/dependent variables (see Section 7.2). In addition, a two-
port model of a device is only valid if a true ground plane exists; i.e. the ground is of zero
potential, zero resistance, and is continuous [65].
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7.1.1 ABCD parameters
For our analysis we chose ABCD parameters because of the ease of combining ABCD models
for multiple components in a cascaded or chained fashion (when using ABCD parameters with
multiple components connected in a cascaded configuration, it is only necessary to perform
simple matrix multiplication to determine their combined response). This allows us to build
more complicated models, in which additional component models are added to the chain, to
see how different components affect a device’s signal in combination with ease.
ABCD parameters treat V1 and I1 as dependent variables and V2 and I2 as independent


































In characterising a device that operates over a bandwidth, it is necessary to determine ABCD
parameters at multiple frequencies. The question of how ABCD parameters for a component
may be obtained is discussed in Section 7.2.
7.1.2 Proposed model
To determine the affect of an arbitrary device component on the voltage signal Vs, we
propose the following model where ZS represents the impedance of the source generating





, and the box M represents





, at the frequency of VS for the component under
consideration. The voltage across ZL is then the modified signal VS , which is found by solving
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Figure 7.2 Model to examine how an input signal (V S) is affected by a component with
ABCD parameters of M (Z S is the impedance of the source generating V S and
Z L is the impedance of a test load).



















where YL = 1/ZL. As the output port is an open circuit, I2 = 0; furthermore, we need only










where ZIN is the input impedance of the cascade (the component plus the shunt load). As per
the definition of ABCD parameters, dividing (7.2a) by (7.2c) gives ZIN = A/C. The input





Allowing the source impedance to equal the load impedance, ZS = ZL, substituting (7.6) into





a+ d+ bYL + c/YL
(7.7)
Equation 7.7 thus describes how the signal Vs would be affected by passing through an arbitrary







As the operating frequency of a component increases, the wave-nature of input/output
signals is manifested; i.e. wires are better thought of as transmission lines and signals take on
the form of travelling waves. For this reason high-speed devices are often characterised using
scattering parameters (S-parameters), which can be defined in terms of travelling waves, instead
of ABCD parameters. As scattering parameters consist of linear combinations of voltages and
currents at the input and output terminals of a component—again, depending on whether or
not a measurements can be taken directly at the terminals, these may or may not be defined
in terms of travelling waves—and are thus convertible to ABCD parameters.
For illustrative purposes, we shall assume that voltage and current are measured at the
terminals of the component; i.e. wave phenomena may be ignored. While this simplification is
acceptable for 10Mb devices (attenuation on the transmit pins of a 10/100 Ethernet card is at
least 5 dB at 20MHz and 35 dB at 40MHz [67]), high-speed networking devices would require
S-parameters defined in terms of travelling waves (see chapter three of [65]).

































where Z1 and Z2 are the impedances of the source and load, respectively, causing the excitation
of the component. Under the assumption that Z0 = Z1 = Z2 and that the source and load
impedances used in Figure 7.2 are equivalent to Z1 and Z2, respectively, the equivalent ABCD
parameters are [65]
A =














(1− S11) (1 + S22) + S12S21
2S21
(7.9d)
S-parameters can be measured using an oscilloscope and a phase meter; however, this
approach becomes tedious when it is necessary to measure the parameters across a range
of frequencies. Thus, network analysers are more commonly employed to determine how a
component will respond to an arbitrary input, within a given bandwidth. Both vector and
scalar network analysers exist; the former provides complex S-parameters, which tell how the
magnitude and phase of a signal would be affected by the component, while the latter gives
information only about how the magnitude of a signal would be altered. For the matched filter
methodology, both the magnitude and phase of the signal are important for device identification,
as, while the phase of the fundamental frequency is irrelevant (the filter will be aligned to it),
if the phase of the harmonics is modified destructive interference may result. Similarly, if the
magnitude of any of the frequency bins is affected the signal amplitude may be attenuated or
amplified, depending on the character of the component, either of which might produce a signal
with a filter output outside of the thresholds set for the device.
7.3 Determining component significance
In order to discover whether a particular component plays a significant role in device vari-
ation, models of the component drawn from several Ethernet cards, based on their measured
S-parameters, would need to be constructed. An idealised signal, derived by averaging the
waveforms from each of the devices, for each model of card, would serve as the input to the
104
model. Matched filters for each device would be built using the output of the model and
applied to each devices output in turn. If signal variation originates at the component, we
would expect to see differences in filter outputs, though even stronger evidence of this affect
would come in the form of collisions between the simulated signals from devices known to have
shown significant overlap from the experiments. The extent to which a particular component
contributes to the uniqueness of a device could be estimated using a quantity of information
calculation.
7.3.1 Constructing model input
As the cards studied in Section 4.4 were easily differentiable across model type, an idealised
signal (i.e. a signal composed of attributes unique only to the model of the cards), Ai, for each
of the i models of Ethernet cards could be constructed by taking n records, selected at random,
from each of the device’s datasets, aligning, and then averaging. This signal, Ai serves as the
input, VS , to the model depicted in Figure 7.2.
7.3.2 Producing model output




aj + dj + bjYL + cj/YL
(7.10)
where device j is a member of model i and aj , bj , cj , dj are the ABCD parameters derived from
the S-parameter measurements, for the jth device, of the component being tested. The value of
ZS , and hence ZL, according to the assumptions laid out above, should be equal to the source
impedance used in the S-parameter measurements.
It must be remembered that ABCD parameters are defined as a function of frequency.
Thus, it is necessary that ABCD parameters be found for each frequency bin of Ai and then
be applied only to the corresponding bin. More explicitly, allowing A = F {A}, the output for
the kth bin is
Vj2(k) =
Ai(k)
aj(k) + dj(k) + bj(k)YL + cj(k)/YL
(7.11)
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where aj(k), bj(k), cj(k), dj(k) are the ABCD parameters measured at the frequency of the





. As each bin is of finite width, it is not possible to have exact ABCD parameters;
interpolation between measured parameters, to fill in for unmeasured frequencies, and/or the
addition of multiple frequencies, to account for the frequencies contained within a bin, must
therefore be used.
7.3.3 Evaluating model output
In seeking to determine the affects a particular component has on a signal, we are actually
asking two questions: how much of an affect does the component have (i.e. how significant
is the component: is it enough to explain the differences we see between cards?) and does it
actually produce the unique characteristics our classifier uses to differentiate devices?
Significance
To calculate the significance a component has in determining device identity, we can calcu-
late how much information is added to the ideal signal by the device model and check whether
it is enough to make up the difference between the information of the ideal signal and the actual
measured waveforms of the device. Specifically, allowing uA = I (Ai) to be some measure of
the information of Ai, we then measure the average information, uj , contained in n of device






uj − uA × 100 (7.12)
then tells us what percentage of unique information the component is responsible for.
Identity
Even if a component can be shown to add a great deal of information to a signal, we must
still find out whether it is information that develops a device’s identity. To do this, we generate
m test signals, based upon the appropriate Ai, for each device, pass them through the device’s
model, select one of the modified signals to act as the device’s matched filter, and, following
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the procedure laid out in Section 4.3, produce filter outputs for each device against itself and
all the other devices.
To simulate the natural variability observed in the captured waveforms, a small amount of
additive white gaussian noise should be added to each test signal. So long as the variances
of the devices’ actual filter outputs are approximately equal, this will produce an equivalent
overlap between the filter outputs, should any exist. If the filter outputs diverge, we can infer
that the component does in fact contribute to a devices identify; significantly, if any collisions
occur and happen to correspond with the collisions identified in Tables 4.3–4.5, we can infer
an even stronger relationship between the device’s identity and the component.
7.4 Conclusion
We have proposed a methodology, based upon an empirical two-port model, capable of
determining the extent to which an arbitrary component of a device contributes to its unique
behaviour, as manifested by a PLIS. The methodology describes how a component should be
measured to create a model that captures component behaviour over the entire bandwidth of
its operation, as well as how an input signal that represents a generic device can be used with
the model to evaluate the component’s affect on creating device identity.
For future work, we suggest that the methods outlined above be applied to the transformer
found on all 10/100 Ethernet cards. More specifically, for the devices available to us each
transmit/receive pair is connected to an IC that houses a transformer in addition to a low-
pass filter (the cutoff frequency and filter order differs between the transmit and receive pins
[67]). We believe that the transformer likely contributes to the uniqueness of a device’s signal
because of the degree to which the transformer and low-pass filter must affect the signal (the
transformer increases or decreases the amplitude of the signal while the low-pass filter shapes
it).
As this transformer is actually a four-port component our methodology would require some
slight modification. The ABCD parameter model would have to be reworked to account for
the increase in variables from four to sixteen. Specifically, the derivation for the component’s
output would need to be altered to reflect the fact that the component produces two outputs
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instead of one. As the transformer is employed in the transmission of a differential signal,
it should be measured using a setup appropriate for differential four-port S-parameters. If a
proper four-port analysis is infeasible, an approximate analysis could be effected by performing
two-port measurements, wherein the two ports not being measured are terminated using a
load impedance equal to the output impedance of the network analyser, and then combining
the resulting S-parameters to form a four-port matrix. The drawback of this simplification
is that the influence the disconnected ports have on the measured ports would not be taken
into account. Finally, evaluating the model output for a four-port device necessitates that the
idealised signal be composed of the unreconstructed differential signals.
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CHAPTER 8. FUTURE WORK
Specific avenues of future work for each of the areas discussed in this work have been
proposed in the conclusion sections of each chapter: the longterm tracking of devices and
forensics applications (Section 4.5); evaluation of the security of PLIS (Section 5.5); determining
how many devices a PLIS is capable of distinguishing between (Section 6.2); and where and
how device identity originates (Section 7.4).
In what follows we outline specific courses of research to investigate: 1) whether our ability
to differentiate between a small sample of devices implies the ability to differentiate the entire
device population (extent of variation); and 2) how multiple features of a device’s signal can
be used in combination to come to a decision regarding its identity for high-speed networking
technologies and to thwart type one and two attacks (increasing difference sensitivity).
8.1 Extent of variation
Up until this point, all experimental work (including our own) concerning proposed PLIS
have lacked the necessary statistical rigour and proper design to be able to draw conclusions
about the efficacy of either the specific approach or PLI in general. Samples of devices used
in experiments range from fewer than five to slightly more than 100, and appear to have been
selected mainly due to their ready availability. Certainly preliminary experimentation, carried
out on a small scale, should be performed before embarking on larger scale experiments. PLI
has matured to the point (both in techniques and methodology), however, to warrant a proper
investigation into whether or not large numbers of devices can in fact be distinguished. The
only way to achieve this is through sample surveying. We therefore propose to perform a, or
devise a framework for, proper sample survey of devices to measure the anticipated real world
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performance of a PLIS.
Outline of proposed research
The simplest, though not the most widely used, form of sample survey is simple random
sample without replacement (SI) [57]. Under SI we assume that the probability of picking the





, while the probability
of selecting any particular member k of the population U is pik = n/N and the probability of
selecting any two members, k and l (k 6= l), is pikl = n(n−1)N(N−1) . To determine the mean of some
population parameter, denoted by ˆ¯yUpi , we select a sample and sum over all members of the














where Vˆ (y¯s) is the estimate









It is important to note that increasing n results in a smaller variance estimate and hence a
tighter interval, so it is always better to have as large as sample size as possible.
For our sample survey, estimating the population mean of the APRS metrics set out above
would be used to determine the performance of a PLIS in a real world deployment. There are,
however, several parameters and design considerations that must be defined before a survey
can be carried out. For instance, while the SI surveys are easy to formulate they often require a
large number of samples to produce a reasonable estimate (the confidence interval tends to be
too wide due to a small n). In practice, auxiliary variables that correlate with the population
parameter being measured are used reduce the variance estimate [57]. Thus far, we have failed
to correlate filter overlap, in the case of the matched filter, to either distances between MAC
address or chipset markings. As the number of elements in the sample, n, will be limited by
the number of cards donated/purchased by the researchers or lab computers made available to
them, a sufficiently large n may not be forthcoming. The way in which the cards are procured
may also have an impact on p(s) (this probability is of equal importance to the attacker) and it
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must be determined how large the population N is to be (while 248 MAC address are possible,
using this number for N would render a rather wide estimate for the APRS metrics).
8.2 Increasing difference sensitivity
Preliminary work, undertaken using data records that consist of 10, 000 samples points
acquired at 1 Gigasamples/s, indicates that the matched filter is unable to distinguish between
Ethernet devices operating in 100Mb mode, though this may be due to the hardware used in
capturing 100Mb data. As the signalling behaviour of 100Mb Ethernet is dramatically different
from 10Mb, it is difficult to acquire accurate samples suitable for use in PLI (i.e. to find a
portion of the signal that is recurrent and ubiquitous).
Furthermore, as the matched filter is a sum-of-squares operation it is vulnerable to a simple
amplitude modulation attack (Section 5.4). Though this type of attack could be defined as
outside any realistic threat model, it nonetheless is at least theoretically possible. We therefore
propose to make use of a multi-dimensional change detection framework (ChDF) [68] to increase
our ability to distinguish between Ethernet devices operating in 100Mb mode and improve upon
weaknesses in the matched filter PLIS.
Outline of proposed research
Allow S to represent a N × k (observation-by-variable) multi-dimensional data set derived
from the distribution S. A generic formulation of the ChDF allows us to answer the question of
whether another set of data, T =M ×k (M < N) also originates from S (the null hypothesis).
To do so, we first partition S = S1 ∪ S2, then select M samples at random from S2 (denote
these samples as R), we then calculate whether d (S1, R) < d (S1, T ), where







|S1|G (Σi, X(j)− S1(i))
and Σi is the bandwidth of the multiplicative Gaussian kernel






(X(j)− S1(i))Σ−1i (X(j)− S1(i))T
]
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The bandwidth for the individual kernels is calculated from S1 using an expectation maximi-
sation algorithm described in [68].
The distances between the S1 and the distributions R and T are carried out in a Monte
Carlo fashion (at each iteration another M samples are selected at random, using replacement,
from S2) until the null hypothesis can or cannot be rejected at significance p. Details of the
Monte Carlo approach are given in [68].
To make use of the ChDF in a PLIS, we allow each record to serve as an observation
and each sample point, or alternatively frequency bin, as a variable; S would represent the
set of signals from a known device and T signals from a test device. It may prove necessary
to use the frequency domain exclusively if the signals cannot be adequately aligned (while
alignment is always possible, the voltage at a particular sample point may vary due to triggering
errors). In any case, as the number of sample points is large (being proportional to the sample
rate) and the ChDF algorithm has runtime O
(|S1|k2), it will be necessary to either perform
dimension reduction (using statistical techniques or by trading-off a higher sampling rate for
higher resolution) or by randomly selecting a subset of variables from S1 to use with the distance
metric each time a new T is tested. It must also be decided how the size of T affects proper
identification; i.e., is it necessary to use one frame or many to determine the identity of a card?
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CHAPTER 9. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this work we have: 1) delineated the major areas of study in physical layer identification
and laid out a course of future work for researchers in these areas; 2) examined the body of
literature that comprises the field of physical layer identification; 3) proposed a theoretically
secure methodology for device identification and compared it with existing methodologies; 4)
shown how the matched filter can be used to differentiate devices of the same model oper-
ating under the same channel conditions; 5) identified those portions of the 10Mb Ethernet
signal most useful for device identification under a matched filter PLIS; 6) provided evidence
that further research into PLI forensics is justified; 7) defined two types of attacks on PLIS;
8) proposed a framework to measure the resistance of a PLIS to an attack using an arbitrary
waveform generator; 9) provided a way to estimate how many devices a PLIS is theoretically ca-
pable of distinguishing between; and 10) shown how an arbitrary component can be empirically
modelled to determine how much it contributes to device variation.
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APPENDIX A. MATLAB data acquisition routine
1 % NOTE: we assume t ha t the scope has been c o r r e c t l y con f i gured to capture
2 % 10Mb data ; furthermore , t h i s c on f i g u r a t i on has been saved to ’ Setup 1 ’
3 % on the scope . I f ’ Setup 1 ’ does not conta in the appropr ia t e s e t t i n g s
4 % f i l e , i t may r e t r i e v e d from the compact f l a s h card accompanying the
5 % scope−− i t has been saved as ’ d i lon10mb 2 5gs . se t ’ . Having loaded the
6 % s e t t i n g s f i l e , the se tup shou ld then be resaved to ’ Setup 1 ’ .
7
8 %
9 % CONNECTION VAR
10 %
11 % se t hw address f o r connect ion to scope ( i f hw address has changed−−i . e . ,
12 % the scope i s p lugged in t o a d i f f e r e n t USB port−−then r e f e r to
13 % ’ mat l a b v i s a connec t i on . t x t ’ to determine por t s e t t i n g s
14 vu = v i s a ( ’ n i ’ , ’USB0 : : 0 x0699 : : 0 x0401 : : C010098 : : INSTR ’ ) ;
15 % se t t r a n s f e r b u f f e r to record l en g t h :
16 % d i f f e r e n c e o f query ( vu , ’DATA:START? ’) and query ( vu , ’DATA:STOP? ’)
17 % ASIDE: shou ld t r y to make t h i s a mu l t i p l e o f bus width . . .
18 vu . InputBu f f e rS i z e =280000;
19
20 %
21 % SESSION VAR
22 %
23 % number o f records to capture
24 n = 10%10010;
25 % leng t h o f record
26 l = 280000;
27 % sample ra t e
28 s = 2 .50∗10ˆ9 ;
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29 % save d i r e c t o r y ( remember t r a i l i n g s l a s h )
30 recDi r = ’D:\ DILON\new recs \ ’ ;
31
32 % open connect ion to scope
33 fopen ( vu ) ;
34 % con f i gu r e scope f o r 10Mb capture ( r e c a l l ’ Setup 1 ’) ; may need to r e c a l l
35 % manually . . . p robab l y s a f e r to load manual ly
36 % f p r i n t f ( vu , ’∗RCL 1 ’) ;
37 % determine y−increment ( v o l t a g e s c a l e )
38 y inc = str2num( query (vu , ’WFMP:YMULT? ’ ) ) ;
39 % se t data c o l l e c t i o n po in t s
40 fpr intf (vu , ’DATA:START 340001 ’ ) ; %beg inn ing o f record , in b u f f e r o f 1∗10ˆ6
41 fpr intf (vu , ’DATA:STOP 620000 ’ ) ; %end o f record , in b u f f e r
42
43 rec = zeros (1 , l ) ;
44 ch1 = zeros (1 , l ) ;
45 ch2 = zeros (1 , l ) ;
46 i = 1 ; %curren t rec cnt
47 badRecs = 0 ;
48
49 % beg in t imer
50 t ic ;
51 % in s t r u c t scope to take s i n g l e measurement
52 fpr intf (vu , ’ACQ:STATE ON’ ) ;
53 while ( i <= n)
54 t = round( toc ) ; % ge t current running time
55 disp ( [ ’ Record : ’ num2str( i ) ’ / ’ num2str(n) . . .
56 ’ (% ’ num2str( i /n∗100) . . .
57 ’ , num. bad : ’ num2str( badRecs ) ’ ) ; ’ . . .
58 ’ Elapsed time : ’ num2str( f loor ( t /3600) ) ’ hr . ’ . . .
59 num2str(mod( f loor ( t /60) ,60) ) ’ min . ’ . . .
60 num2str(mod( t , 6 0 ) ) ’ s e c . ’ ] ) ;
61
62 % wait f o r scope to f i n i s h measurement ( check scope s t a t e every 1/10
63 % of a second )
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64 while str2num( query (vu , ’ACQ:STATE? ’ ) ) == 1
65 pause ( . 1 0 ) ;
66 end
67
68 % ge t channel one data
69 fpr intf (vu , ’DATA:SOURCE CH1 ’ ) ;
70 fpr intf (vu , ’CURVE? ’ ) ;
71 ch1 = binb lockread (vu , ’ i n t8 ’ ) ’ ;
72 % ge t channel two data
73 fpr intf (vu , ’DATA:SOURCE CH2 ’ ) ;
74 fpr intf (vu , ’CURVE? ’ ) ;
75 ch2 = binb lockread (vu , ’ i n t8 ’ ) ’ ;
76
77 % to save time , t r i g g e r new measurement on scope
78 fpr intf (vu , ’ACQ:STATE ON’ ) ;
79
80 % ensure t ha t rec i s good ( l i n k pu l s e s do not f a l l much be low 0V, so we
81 % check t ha t sampled s i g n a l i s very nega t i v e )
82 i f min( ch1 (6000 :8000) ) < −80 %shou ld be w e l l i n t o sync s i g n a l by here
83 % recover d i f f e r e n t i a l s i g n a l
84 rec = yinc ∗( ch1 − ch2 ) ;
85
86 % wr i t e record to f i l e
87 i s = num2str( i ) ;
88 f = [ recDi r ’ sample ’ . . .
89 strrep (num2str( zeros (1 ,5− length ( i s ) ) ) , ’ ’ , ’ ’ ) i s ’ . mat ’ ] ;
90 save ( f , ’ s ’ , ’ r e c ’ ) ;
91
92 % increment good rec s counter
93 i = i + 1 ;
94
95 else % we have a bad record , save i t and modify counters
96 badRecs = badRecs + 1 ;
97
98 % wr i t e raw channel data to f i l e
116
99 badRecStr = num2str( badRecs ) ;
100 f = [ recDi r ’ bsample ’ badRecStr ’ . mat ’ ] ;
101 save ( f , ’ ch1 ’ , ’ ch2 ’ , ’ s ’ , ’ y inc ’ ) ;
102 end
103
104 % zero channel data to ensure we don ’ t wr i t e d u p l i c a t e records
105 ch1 = zeros (1 , l ) ;
106 ch2 = zeros (1 , l ) ;
107 end
108
109 % c l o s e connect ion to scope
110 fc lose ( vu ) ;
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APPENDIX B. Code for type one attack
Resolution
1 function [ n , s avg2 ] = getReso lu t i on2 ( s avg , r e f S i g , th p , th n , V fs )
2 % f ind minimum number o f b i t s (n) necessary to r ep re s en t s avg and s t i l l
3 % have f i l t e r output w i th in th p / th n f o r an AWG with g iven V FS
4 % n : r e s o l u t i o n o f AWG
5 % s avg2 : v a l i d r e p r e s en t a t i on o f s avg us ing f ewe s t number o f b i t s
6
7 n = 14 ; %won ’ t cons ider AWG with r e s o l u t i o n s above 14 b i t s
8
9 % f ind p o s s i b l e v o l t a g e va l u e s g i ven n and V fs and round s avg towards i t
10 s avg2 = s avg ;
11 while dot ( r e f S i g , s avg2 ) >= th n && dot ( r e f S i g , s avg2 ) <= th p
12 % ca l c y inc based upon n and V fs
13 y inc = V fs /(2ˆn−1) ;
14 % po s s i b l e v o l t a g e va l u e s g i ven n and V fs
15 v = yinc ∗(−2ˆn : 1 : 2 ˆ n−1) ’ ;
16 % f ind which new vo l t a g e l e v e l each sample po in t o f s avg i s c l o s e s t to
17 [ ˜ , I ] = min(abs ( bsxfun (@minus , s avg ’ , v ) ) ) ;
18
19 s avg o l d = s avg2 ; %won ’ t know i f we shou ld s top u n t i l a f t e r we ’ ve
20 %ove rwr i t t en v a l i d s avg2
21 s avg2 = v( I ) ;
22 n = n − 1 ;
23 end
24
25 % re s t o r e f a l s e l y decremented b i t and need a d d i t i o n a l b i t f o r s i gn
26 n = n + 2 ;
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27 s avg2 = s avg o l d ;
Settling time
1 function [ ts , tr , td ] = getTs ( s avg , s n , f s )
2 % f ind s e t t i n g l i n g time ( t s ) necessary to c r ea t e s i g n a l between s +/−
3 % assuming PLIS sampler wi th g iven f s
4 % t s : s e t t l i n g time o f AWG
5 % tr : r i s e time o f AWG
6 % td : dead time o f AWG
7
8 l = length ( s avg ) ;
9 T = 1/ f s ;
10
11 % se t td . . . r e a l l y i s immater ia l as we care about sum of t r and td
12 td = 0.01∗T;
13 % percentage o f s avg AWG must reach at each sample po in t
14 p s avg = abs ( s n ) . / abs ( s avg ) ;
15 % only care about max percentage ( shou ld always be l e s s than one . . . doesn ’ t
16 % make sense f o r i t to be g r ea t e r than one−−−an a r t i f a c t o f sampl ing )
17 m p s avg = max( p s avg ( p s avg < 1) ) ;
18
19 % max r i s e time f o r s n
20 t r = (T−td ) /( m p s avg ) ;
21 % s e t t l i n g time
22 t s = td + t r ;
SNR
1 function [ snr , sn r s , N s avg ] = getSnr ( r e f S i g , s avg , th p , th n )
2 % f ind SNR necessary to c r ea t e s i g n a l wi th f i l t e r output ou t s i d e o f t h +/−
3 % snr : SNR of AWG in dB
4
5 % since we ’ re genera t ing random noise , we run t h i s many t imes to be sure o f
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6 % the c a l c u l a t e d snr
7 n = 1000 ;
8 % snr per i t e r a t i o n ; average to f i nd snr
9 SNR = zeros (n , 1 ) ;
10
11 for i = 1 : n
12 s n r i = 30 ; %max SNR in dB
13 snr dec = 0 . 0 1 ; %amount to decrease SNR by u n t i l s i g n a l ou t s i d e o f t h +/−
14
15 N s avg = s avg ; %our noisy s i g n a l
16 m0 = dot ( r e f S i g , N s avg ) ;
17
18 while m0 >= th n && m0 <= th p
19 s n r i = s n r i − sn r dec ;
20 N s avg = awgn( s avg , s n r i , ’ measured ’ ) ;
21 m0 = dot ( r e f S i g , N s avg ) ;
22 end
23
24 SNR( i ) = s n r i ;
25 end
26
27 snr = mean(SNR) ;
28 s n r s = std (SNR) ;
THD
1 function [THD] = getThd ( s avg , s p , s n )
2 % f ind max THD tha t keeps s i g n a l w i th in bounds s e t by A +/−
3 % THD: THD in dB fo r each f r e q b in
4
5 S avg = f f t ( s avg ) ;
6 D p = f f t ( s p−s avg ) ; %f f t o f d i s t o r t i o n
7 D n = f f t ( s avg−s n ) ;
8
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9 bw = 121 ; %index o f maximum frequency f o r THD ca l c s ; i . e . bandwidth over which
THD i s c a l c u l a t e d
10 THD = zeros (bw−1 ,2) ; %THD i s c a l c u l a t e d on bin−by−b in b a s i s
11 n har = 9 ; %num of harmonics to use when c a l c u l a t i n g THD; s i x or ten depending
upon standard ( those inc l ude fundamenta )
12 n b ins = s ize ( S avg , 1 ) ; %num of b in s
13
14 for i = 2 :bw %S avg (1) i s DC, which i s exc luded in THD ca l c s
15 h ind = ( i −1) ∗ [ 2 : n har+1]+1; %in d i c i e s o f our harmonics
16
17 % ignore denominator as we ’ re t a k ing r a t i o s be low
18 P = (2∗abs ( S avg ( i ) ) . ˆ 2 ) ; %power o f und i s t o r t e d fundamental f r e q
19 P p = 2∗sum(abs (D p( h ind ) ) . ˆ 2 ) ; %power o f d i s t o r t e d harmonic
20 P n = 2∗sum(abs (D n( h ind ) ) . ˆ 2 ) ;
21
22 THD( i −1 ,1) = 10∗ log10 (P p/P) ;
23 THD( i −1 ,2) = 10∗ log10 (P n/P) ;
24 end
THD+N
1 function [THDN] = getThdN( r e f S i g , s avg , s p , th p , th n )
2
3 % de f i n e (max) d i s t o r t i o n
4 d p = s p−s avg ;
5
6 % d = d inc ∗d p
7 d inc = 0 . 1 ;
8
9 S avg = f f t ( s avg ) ;
10 D p = f f t ( d p ) ; %f f t o f d i s t o r t i o n
11
12 bw = 121 ; %index o f maximum frequency f o r THD ca l c s ; i . e . bandwidth over which
THD i s c a l c u l a t e d
13 THDN = zeros (bw−1 ,1/ d inc ) ; %THD i s c a l c u l a t e d on bin−by−b in b a s i s
121
14 n har = 9 ; %num of harmonics to use when c a l c u l a t i n g THD; s i x or ten depending
upon standard ( those inc l ude fundamenta )
15 n b ins = s ize ( S avg , 1 ) ; %num of b in s
16
17
18 for k = d inc : d inc : 1
19 k ind = round (1/( d inc /k ) ) ;
20 d = k∗d p ;
21 D = f f t (d) ;
22
23 pa r f o r i = 2 :bw %S avg (1) i s DC, which i s exc luded in THD ca l c s
24 i 2 = i −2; %fundamental f r e q on r i g h t s i d e
25 h ind = ( i −1) ∗ [ 2 : n har+1]+1; %in d i c i e s o f our harmonics ; l e f t s i d e
26 h ind2 = h ind −2; %in d i c i e s o f our harmonics ; r i g h t s i d e
27 h = [ h ind h ind2 ] ; %harmonics , both s i d e s
28
29 %s i g n a l we ’ l l add d i s t o r t i o n to
30 SD = S avg ;
31 % only add in d i s t o r t i o n components f o r b in under cons i d e ra t i on
32 SD(h) = SD(h) + D(h) ; %s i g n a l p l u s d i s t o r t i o n
33 sd = i f f t (SD) ; %need time−domain f o r no i se c a l c s
34 % add noi se to d i s t o r t e d s i g n a l u n t i l o u t s i d e o f t h +/− (bw o f
35 % noise i s f s /2)
36 [ snr , sn r s , n sd ] = getSnr ( r e f S i g , sd , th p , th n ) ;
37 % need j u s t the no i se f o r c a l c s ( f f t , a c t u a l l y )
38 N = f f t ( n sd − sd ) ;
39
40 % ignore denominator as we ’ re t a k ing r a t i o s be low
41 P = 2∗abs ( S avg ( i ) ) ˆ2 ; %power o f und i s t o r t e d fundamental f r e q
42 P p = 2∗sum(abs (D p( h ind ) ) . ˆ 2 ) ; %power o f d i s t o r t e d harmonics
43 P N = sum(abs (N) . ˆ 2 ) ; %noise over bw=f s /2
44





1 function s f d r = getS fdr2 ( s avg , r e f S i g , th p , th n )
2 % f ind SFDR ra t i o necessary to produce f i l t e r output f o r s avg ou t s i d e o f
3 % thp / thn ; b in s inc luded based on power
4 % s avg : average o f a l i gn ed records ; a t t acke r ’ s s i g n a l cons t ruc t ed from
5 % t h i s on a per b in b a s i s
6 % re f S i g : r e f s i g o f genuine dev i c e
7 % th p / th n : t h r e s h o l d s f o r f i l t e r output
8 % s f d r : n−by−1 vec t o r o f s f d r necessary to put s avg ou t s i d e o f t h r e s h o l d s ;
9 % each row corresponds to number o f components used to cons t ruc t a t t acke r ’ s
10 % s i g n a l
11
12 % num of components to cons ider
13 n = f loor ( s ize ( s avg , 1 ) /2) ;
14 % s f d r : r a t i o o f noise−to−s i g n a l f o r each o f the i−components used in c r ea t i n g
15 % at tacke r ’ s s i g n a l ; 0 denotes t ha t number o f components used wasn ’ t
16 % s u f f i c i e n t to c r ea t e a t t a c k e r s i g n a l w i th in t h r e s h o l d s
17 s f d r = zeros (n , 1 ) ;
18
19 S avg = f f t ( s avg ) ;
20 l = s ize ( S avg , 1 ) ;
21
22 % obta in i n d i c e s o f b in power so r t ed from g r e a t e s t to l e a s t
23 [B, IX ] = sort (abs ( S avg ( 1 : f loor ( l /2) ) ) , ’ descend ’ ) ; IX=IX ’ ;
24
25 % inc l ude i b in s in a t t a c k e r s i g n a l cons t ruc t i on
26 pa r f o r i = 1 : f loor ( l /2)
27 % at tacke r ’ s s i gna l , f r e q . domain
28 S at t = zeros ( l , 1 ) ;
29
30 % add i n d i v i d u a l components to a t tacker ’ s s i g n a l
31 i f isempty ( find ( IX ( 1 : i ) == 1 ,1) ) %i f DC component i s absent
32 S at t ( [ IX ( 1 : i ) end−IX ( 1 : i ) +2]) = S avg ( [ IX ( 1 : i ) end−IX ( 1 : i ) +2]) ;
33 else %dc component pre sen t
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34 %remove dc component index so i t doesn ’ t mess up r i g h t hand s i d e index
c a l c s
35 IX2 = IX( IX ( 1 : i ) ˜= 1) ; %dc always at index one
36 S at t ( [ 1 IX2 ( 1 : i −1) end−IX2 ( 1 : i −1)+2]) = . . .
37 S avg ( [ 1 IX2 ( 1 : i −1) end−IX2 ( 1 : i −1)+2]) ;
38 end
39
40 % at tacke r ’ s time domain s i g n a l us ing i most power fu l b in s
41 s a t t = i f f t ( S a t t ) ;
42
43 % prepare to add no i se to s a t t
44 s n o i = s a t t ; %s a t t wi th no i se added to i t
45 r = −100; %noise−to−s i g n a l component r a t i o ( s f d r ) ; s t a r t a t −100 dB and
inc rea se
46
47 % check to see i f a t t acker ’ s s i g n a l f a l l s w i th in t h r e sho l d s , i f so then
48 % genera te no i se f o r each component and add i t to a t t acke r ’ s s i g n a l
49 while dot ( r e f S i g , s n o i ) >= th n && dot ( r e f S i g , s n o i ) <= th p
50 S no i = S at t ;
51
52 % add noi se to S a t t f o r j t h component
53 for j = 1 : i
54 % power o f j t h component o f S a t t
55 i f IX( j ) == 1 %dc component on ly uses one b in
56 p j = abs ( S a t t ( IX( j ) ) ) ˆ2/ l ˆ2 ;
57 else
58 p j = 2∗abs ( S a t t ( IX( j ) ) ) ˆ2/ l ˆ2 ;
59 end
60 % gen noi se o f s u f f i c i e n t power so t ha t we reach r a t i o o f r=n/s
61 noi = genNoise (10ˆ( r /10) ∗p j , l ) ;
62 % where we ’ l l put the no i se ( p laced randomly )
63 no i i nd = randi ( [ 1 f loor ( l /2) ] ) ;
64 % add noi se to s a t t
65 S no i ( no i i nd+1) = S no i ( no i i nd+1) + noi ; %l e f t s i d e




69 s n o i = i f f t ( S no i ) ;
70 r = r + 1 ;
71 end
72




77 function n = genNoise (p , l )
78 % genera te complex no i se o f power p
79
80 x = sqrt (p∗ l ˆ2/2) ∗rand (1 ) ; %rea l par t o f no i se
81 y = sqrt (p∗ l ˆ2/2−xˆ2) ; %complex par t o f no i se
82
83 % determine s i gn o f each component
84 i f rand (1 ) < 0 .5
85 x = −1∗x ;
86 end
87
88 i f rand (1 ) < 0 .5
89 y = −1∗y ;
90 end
91
92 n = x + 1 j ∗y ;
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